Military Leadership

The political officer – “zampolit” – will return to the Russian military by the end of the year. That was announced last week in Izvestia. The zampolits will have a range of tasks related to morale and political homogenization of the units.

The step is not surprising. Russia has long worked to tighten the control with the soldiers’ exposure to unfavorable viewpoints. Back in February, they introduced strict guidelines about access to social media, and in May they restricted telephone use to high-ranking officers. In July, president Putin ordered the formation of a military-political directorate in the Defense Ministry to boost morale. The step to reintroduce political officers is an initiative by the new political directorate, which is set to be fully up and running before 1 December 2018.

I have a few thoughts about this. I think we shouldn’t overestimate the significance of this particular step of reintroducing zampolits. I also think that the long-term effects will be harmful for the Russian military. But before I get to that, I will quickly summarize what the zampolits are supposed to do.

They will be quite high-ranking officers who will report directly to the commander. Each regiment, battalion, company, echelon, garrison, and major warship¹ will have a one. They will be responsible for the patriotic spirit among the soldiers and their support for the security politics of the government. The zampolits must keep close attention to the moral, political, and psychological conditions in the unit and report to the commander if there is reason for concern. They will arrange political sessions, curate news bulletins, and explain the president’s recent decisions to the soldiers.

At the smaller unit levels, the zampolit will be closer to the soldiers. He must know the political and military qualities of all officers and non-commissioned officers. He will also participate in the selection of personnel for different units, where he is responsible for the evaluation of psychological compatibility, religiosity, and attitudes toward the service. At the company level, the zampolit will be responsible for the organization of politically acceptable leisure activities and the adherence to good discipline. This does not limit itself to matters of politics, but also discipline and good behavior in general. Finally, the zampolit is the person who listens to wishes that the soldiers may bring forward, and he helps them maintain communications with their families (no doubt properly censored).

Frankly, all this sounds terrible. The picture of a thoroughly brainwashed Russian military force comes to mind easily. But in reality, it is not a big step. Many of these functions exist already in the Russian military, and the zampolits will not be new persons in the structure. Rather, it is a restructuring of the work already conducted by so-called “commanders on educational work”. There is a significant new political angle to the work, where the old job description focused on discipline in general and mental fitness for battle. But Russian soldiers are used to having commanders around who pry into their personal matters, and it’s not like political conviction didn’t matter before.

So really, this is another evolutionary step where the screw is tightened just a little. For example, the old “educators” were supposed to take into account the national and religious considerations of the individual soldier, but now the unifying political message takes precedence. Aleksandr Kanshin, an employee at the Defense Ministry, explaines to Izvestia that this step is necessary:

“In modern conditions of global information war, you have to double down on this work. There is an external reason, which is the need to resist information campaigns. And there is an internal reason. Our country is multinational and multiconfessional, but the military must be one organism. People who have different viewpoints, different religions, different background, must be united through the political education.”

Obviously, the political message today is not communism like in the Soviet Union. But the idea behind the zampolits seems very similar to the work of the political commissars of the communist era. It will help ensure the longevity of Putin’s ideological message.

In the long run, this development is harmful for the Russian military. Enforcement of cognitive homogeneity is not a point in any textbook about innovation. In general, the future calls for soldiers that are capable of independent thought, and that requires regular practice of independent thinking. So at some point, this trend toward mental stagnation among common soldiers will backfire. It will lead to more mistakes in the field, and it will make it altogether more difficult for Russia to achieve its military objectives. But it will be done by soldiers who are deeply convinced.

The chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, has ordered a series of initiatives to protect soldiers from exhaustive work hours. An unhealthy work culture has developed in the Russian military that makes it hard for soldiers to balance family lives with the demands of the service. That reports Kommersant.

Apparently, it has become a standard practice many places to break the official regulations about work hours. So Gerasimov has ordered his generals to change their practices about planning of working time for subordinates. From now on, it is not permitted to conduct meetings during night hours, at weekends, or during official holidays. Also, generals must end the regime that says that subordinates are expected to stay at work until the leader goes home. In general there has to be a compelling necessity if soldiers stay at the workplace after business hours.

Gerasimov’s letter has gone out to commanders of military services, districts, and regiments. It demands that the use of overtime be limited to the lowest possible number of persons, and that it will be compensated with an equivalent period of free time. The commanders must control the adherence to official working hour regulations in their units, do statistics on employee vacations, and conduct surveys among the staffs. They have to report back to the General Staff before October 10. There will also be organized a controlling function in the General Staff.

Problem is poor management and too many meetings

A large part of the problem seems to be poor management practices. A survey by the General Staff has shown that a bad meeting culture has developed in many places. Especially the use of video conferences has contributed to abusive practices. It is not uncommon that commanders have two to three daily meetings with their superior and spend excessive amounts of time in front of a web camera. Often a commander’s workday starts with a meeting with his superior, and he doesn’t get around to his own staff before the second half of the day, at which point the meeting process often repeats itself at a lower level.

Another problem is the habit of delegating tasks with a very tight deadline. Indicators such as “ASAP”, “By tomorrow morning”, or “For Monday” lead to breaches of the regulations where people work at night, weekends, or during holidays.

All this leads to tiredness and reduced preparedness for work. It also increases the social pressure on the soldiers and decreases their satisfaction with their life situation. Gerasimov notes that a hard work schedule can even lead to breakups of families.¹ In combination with Russia’s challenges to provide good housing for military families in some regions, the hard work schedule remains a decisive factor for the motivation of soldiers to continue their military service.

The survey has shown the worst problems in the Southern and Central military districts and in the central command of the Aerospace Forces. The Aerospace Forces are under command of (army) colonel general Sergey Surovikin, who is known for a tough attitude toward his staff. Back in 2004, he famously scolded a subordinate colonel so harshly that he impulsively committed suicide with a handgun in front of the entire staff.