Military Leadership

Forbidding soldiers to talk on the phone doesn’t improve security

2018-05-11 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has introduced some new restrictions on the use of telephones for its personnel. The motivation seems to be to save money on the phone bills and to improve information security. That reports Kommersant. But the consequences may well be the opposite.

Obviously, phone conversations are a source of information leaks, and there is an argument for restricting the use of the civilian phone networks for military communications. However, the actual restrictions seem mostly aimed at making work complicated for the employees, which is a terrible security strategy.

Military personnel will be sorted into five categories, and depending on their category they will be allowed a certain number of minutes or money to spend on telephone calls every month. When the limit of either minutes or rubles is reached, the phone connection is closed until the beginning of next month. In addition to this, units are required to keep a detailed journal of all phone calls.

Every month the unit must make an analysis of the conducted phone calls. Who called whom about what for how long and at what time? This has to be filed in a report. If calls are identified that are not related to government business, an administrative investigation must be conducted to figure out how much money it cost. According to Kommersant, the Ministry of Defense has produced an example where a unit makes an administrative investigation into the suspected waste of government resources to private phone calls for a value of 316 rubles (€4.22). That seems like an awfully small amount to spend administrative resources on investigating.

Putin on telephone — Putin using an old school telephone. Photo: Kremlin.ru.

Most military personnel will not be allowed a direct connection to the phone network at all. Commanders of military units will be allowed up to 60 minutes or 500 rubles per month. A branch or regiment commander will be allowed up to 120 minutes or 850 rubles per month. Only 11 persons including defense minister Sergey Shoygu will have unlimited phone calls.

All in all this sounds like a bureaucratic headache. If I were to guess to possible security angles to this, I can think of these two:

To limit the overall number of phone calls to make it easier for the Russian security apparatus to spy on itself.
To compel military personnel to using more secure means of communication.

Both these things fit nicely with the initiatives that Russia has taken recently. A few months ago the Defense Ministry decided to solve the problems that smartphones present, so they forbade them altogether and produced a list of 11 approved models of dumb phones that soldiers can use. They also recently introduced restrictions on soldiers’ freedom to have a social media presence.

The official Russian approach to security seems to be to forbid technologies that introduce vulnerabilities. But security is also a question of enabling effective business operations. In the end, employees in the Russian military have a job to do. If the ministry and security services make it too complicated to get things done, people are going to work around the system.

As an officer said to Kommersant back in February, nobody within the Ministry of Defense actually intended to give up their smartphones. “You buy a dumb phone to carry around at all times, so you can show it to your superior if you have to. And your normal phone you keep on silent mode in your pocket”.

If employees move their work-related communications to their private telephones, the result will be less security, not more.

Let’s hope insurgents don’t learn basic infantry skills

2018-02-28 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Why is it that Western infantry has been so dominant in battle during counterinsurgency operations? The casualty numbers are exceptionally unequally distributed between Western forces and the insurgents.

Conventional wisdom attributes a lot of importance on superior technology such as air superiority, surveillance systems, precision munitions, command-and-control systems, and night vision capabilities. But what if the most essential advantage is something as mundane as basic infantry skills?

That is the subject of this highly interesting article by Leo Blanken, Kai Thaxton, and Mike Alexander in War on the Rocks. The authors provide some rather convincing examples that this may be the case.

If the ability of groups to coordinate movements and fire is the most important factor in infantry battle, then it is fundamentally a question of learning before insurgents can inflict much more pain than they used to. And in that case we may want to scrutinize our training missions around the world to make sure that we are careful about who learns what.

Is Finland setting the example for military leadership?

2017-10-15 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

It seems that Finland is assuming the position as the country everybody is looking to when it comes to modern military leadership methods. Which is a little annoying because it means that we now have to envy not only Finland’s remarkable PISA scores but also their trust in the military and their defense preparedness.

Whilst in Denmark since the Cold War we have more or less abandoned a territorial defense and focused on deployable assets with professional manning, Finland has maintained the ability to defend itself with mandatory male conscription and a large and active military reserve. And the results are stunning when it comes to the people’s interest and trust in the military. Denmark suffers from the paradox that the military is more or less constantly engaged in wars in other parts of the world, but the people is genuinely disinterested and mostly unaware that it is happening. In the current debates about a new political defense agreement in Denmark, it is common to meet the popular argument that the territorial integrity of Denmark is unrelated to military spending because it’s the responsibility of other NATO countries to defend us anyways.

Finland, on the other hand, maintained a national focus with their armed forces all throughout the honeymoon years with Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. I remember not long ago that we used to smile at Finland’s inability to adjust to a future of deployable assets and excused the apparent paranoia of the Finns with a historic inclination to the solitude of neutrality that prevented them from taking full responsibility in the international environment. Now the security climate has changed in the Baltic Region, and instead of laughing at Finland we suddenly find ourselves reading articles about what we can learn from them.

So what is it that we can learn from Finland? Elisabeth Braw has an interesting article in Foreign Affairs about The Finnish Model, and she has a few ideas. For starters, we can learn that if conscription is widespread and of high quality, it will give whole generations a positive attitude towards the military and enhance the willingness to take responsibility for national defense. Instead of being old-fashioned, conscription may in fact be the model of a future where Europe must prepare to handle security without America. There are historical and geographical reasons for Finland to emphasize the territorial defense higher than in for example Denmark, but the numbers cited about the support for the military and the personal sense of duty among Finns are surely impressive.

According to Braw, we can also learn from Finland that evaluation is a powerful tool to develop military leadership if it is done systematically and with care. It really does seem to be a good evaluation system the Finns have set up, but I would have to look closer at it before I can make a final judgement. Given Finland’s academic traditions in the field of organizational learning, I am prepared to believe that they have done a good job.¹

Finally, Braw notes that Finland is good at setting the right expectations about the military service. It is a matter of branding and delivering on the promises by neither overselling nor underselling the military, and by having an inspiring program where the skills learned in the military can also be used elsewhere.

Surely aspects of these things can also be found in other countries, but it seems that Finland has excelled in systematizing its conscription and the development of methods to improve military leadership. This is actually really exciting, and although it pains me somewhat to admit it, the Finnish model may be worth studying for those of us who until recently believed that the future was deployable.

I don’t think Braw’s point about military commanders learning to talk to soldiers like normal people instead of shouting is particularly ground-breaking for the other Scandinavian countries. During my study time we had annual Nordic Cadet sports games (NOCA) between the naval academies from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the Finnish cadets always stood out with a remarkably shouting attitude towards each other. ↩

Micromanagement or proper oversight?

2017-09-14 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Insightful piece by Micah Zenko in Foreign Policy on the principal-agent relationship between politicians and the military:

Yet, in every conversation I have had with civilian and military officials, I cannot recall a military officer — at any level — having received guidance or direction that was helpful in developing plans or in fulfilling a mission. The recalled examples of interference are always detrimental, wasteful, or, at best, pointless. The fact of the matter is that many senior military officers who do not receive the autonomy, latitude, or funding to do what they want to do — within the timeframe that they want to do it — claim they are being “micromanaged.” But it’s important to recognize that this impression is both subjective and selective. One person’s intrusive micromanagement is another’s proper attention to detail.
[…]
The demonstrable rise in civilian deaths from U.S. airstrikes is most likely the result of several factors, as discussed in previous pieces I’ve written. But the basic point is that Mattis’s judgment has proven incorrect. That should be no surprise. Everything we know from organizational studies suggests that managers and staffers immersed in day-to-day repetitive tasks (like military campaigns) eschew competing values-based priorities — particularly when senior leaders direct them to accelerate their efforts and narrow their mission, as has been true with the war against the Islamic State under Mattis’s watch.

Civilian oversight is so inconvenient but man, do we need it. The whole article is well worth the read.

Exercise scenarios tend to be a waste of time

2017-09-13 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The fictional scenario for Zapad 2017 has gone viral as a joke on social media, and that has led The Wall Street Journal to write a piece on the made-up settings that militaries use for training:

The U.S., its NATO allies, Russia and other militaries around the world use fictional scenarios to make their military drills more sophisticated. They require soldiers to understand the political environment and motivations of the people they are trying to protect, and defeat.

It’s hard to fathom the amount of time staff officers around the world spend drafting these sophisticated scenarios so that other officers can spend time trying to figure out what the heck the exercise is about. The funny thing is that for the most part the scenario is absolutely irrelevant to the desired learning outcome of the training. I say just make a good exercise and don’t spend time overthinking the scenario.