Air Force

Operational countermeasures against Russian A2/AD – My contribution to new FOI report

2020-08-04 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Better late than never. Almost a month ago the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) published a report about Anti-Access and Area Denial warfare (A2/AD), and I had the privilege of contributing with a chapter. However, I have been so busy doing other things that I just didn’t get around to writing a plug here on the blog before now.

The new report is called Beyond Bursting Bubbles, and it is a sequel to their much acclaimed Bursting the Bubble report from last year. In the original report, FOI pointed out that Russian missile capabilities and A2/AD assets are widely overrated in Western defense debates. As they pointed out, there are several obstacles to effective A2/AD, and there are several things the West can do to counter such moves. This piece of truth earned FOI a lot of publicity, as it challenged the widely accepted practice of drawing definitive red circles around Russian strongholds to indicate impenetrable A2/AD bubbles.

The new report is an anthology with contributions from a panel of scholars and practitioners. The list of authors is impressive, and I am humbled to be included:

Michael Jonsson and Robert Dalsjö, FOI (Sweden)
Justin Bronk, Royal United Services Institute,(United Kingdom)
Douglas Barrie, International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom)
Jamie Meighan, Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)
Sam J. Tangredi, US Naval War College (USA)
Anders Puck Nielsen, Royal Danish Defence College (Denmark)
Ilmārs A. Lejiņš, Latvian Army (Latvia)
Robin Häggblom, Independent Analyst (Finland)
Alexander Lanoszka, University of Waterloo (Canada) and Luis Simón, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium)
Keir Giles, Chatham House (United Kingdom)
Ben Hodges, Center for European Policy Analysis (USA)

My own chapter approaches the problem of A2/AD from an operational angle. It is a refined and much improved expression of the argument in this blog post. The essence is that we need to look at A2/AD not only from the angle of what is possible, but also considering if it makes any sense. Russia will only attempt A2/AD if it helps them achieve some desirable political goal. If establishing A2/AD is politically unattractive, they are not going to do it. FOI did a great job last year of debunking some of the myths about Russia’s missiles, but their focus was mainly tactical, and I felt the argument would be even stronger if it included political and strategic perspectives. This leads to what I have chosen to call operational countermeasures against A2/AD, which is basically just a moniker to describe ways to turn A2/AD into a counterproductive political headache for Russia.

One of the benefits to being late with this advertisement is that I get to comment on some of the feedback I have received. If I could write it all over, I would probably spend some more energy on a theoretical discussion about the difference between A2/AD and air combat in general. A surprising number of people seem not to distinguish between these two things, which just goes to show how commoditized the concept of A2/AD has become. I doubt that Russia could use A2/AD as a meaningful tactic in the Baltic region, but obviously I am not arguing that they would avoid using their missiles for air combat in general.

Update on Russia’s weapon development programs

2019-04-08 By Anders Puck Nielsen 2 Comments

If you are wondering how things are going with Russia’s new weapon projects, Julian Cooper has a nice overview in his new paper for CCW titled Russia’s ‘Invincible’ Weapons: An Update. The whole thing is 16 pages, but as a quick reference I have made a summary below.

The very quick conclusion is that Russia has many weapon development programs, but that many of them suffer from delays, technical difficulties, high costs, or questionable practical value in combat.

Weapons that Putin presented in March 2018

In his March 1st 2018 speech to the Federal Assembly, president Putin presented a range of spectacular new weapons.

Kinzhal missile: The air launched version of Iskander is a real weapon in the final phases of testing. So far it only works from a MiG-31, but in the future there may also be variants for Su-57 and Tu-22M3.

Avangard hypersonic glide-boost vehicle: Vladimir Putin has announced that serial production has begun of this advanced re-entry vehicle for a nuclear missile. If that is true, then this weapon is already operational. The defining feature of Avangard is its ability to beat any missile defense system. This comes as a result of the weapon’s speed, range, and unpredictable movements. Observers have questioned, though, Russia’s need for Avangard. Some have described it as an expensive solution to a nonexistent problem (see for example Kofman’s argument here).

Sarmat heavy multi-warhead ICBM: This enormous missile seems on track for deployment within the coming years. The first flight test is expected later in 2019. It will replace the aptly named SS-18 Satan missile.

Peresvet laser weapon: A developmental version of this weapon appears to be working, but it is apparently really large. Essentially, the laser gun needs its own small nuclear power plant, so it takes two wheeled platforms to move the weapon around. That is impractical, so the Russians are working hard to build a more compact version.

On the one hand, expert opinion is that Peresvet may have enough power to destroy electrical systems of aircraft, UAVs, and satellites in low orbit. On the other hand, miniaturization is the problem that everyone is struggling with for laser weapons. So even if Peresvet is working reasonably well in its present condition, the hard part of development may still be ahead.

Poseidon autonomous underwater nuclear torpedo: Officially, development of Russia’s new nuclear torpedo is progressing on schedule. According to press reports, the weapon has demonstrated its potential in factory tests. Russia is also preparing two submarines to carry the torpedo, namely the Khabarovsk and the Belgorod. Both are currently under construction at the Sevmach shipyard.

The weapon itself is a nuclear powered torpedo which can carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. This makes it an underwater nuclear bomb with unlimited range. The idea is that Poseidon can be released at pretty much any geographical location, after which it independently sails to enemy shores and detonates. Obviously, a nuclear explosion is bad in itself, but the accompanying tsunami will also be enormous.

There is, however, also reason for skepticism. Some claims about the performance of Poseidon make it sound like the torpedo is still mostly a dream project. Certain of the alleged qualities of the weapon are usually mutually exclusive, and it seems unrealistic that Russia has been able to merge them without compromises. To that comes that some prominent observers are critical of Poseidon, calling the project both unnecessary and a money drain.

Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile: The nuclear powered missile has run into some problems. Tests have been confirmed, but it is unclear that they have been particularly successful. Also, it is difficult to see what this humongous subsonic missile actually contributes with in terms of combat power. It seems possibile that Russia will abandon Burevestnik at some point and spend the money elsewhere.

Anti-satellite weapons that Putin has not presented

Putin has not presented anti-satellite weapons, and the reason is probably that Russia is a signatory of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibits the militarization of space. While counter-space weapons are not directly illegal under this treaty, state leaders prefer to keep a low profile in this arena.

Nudol PL-19 anti-satellite missile: This anti-satellite missile has been in development since around 2010, and it seems to be at an advanced stage. It is a further development of the A-135 missile defense system which is placed around Moscow.

Tirada electronic anti-satellite system: Tirada-2.3 is an electronic warfare system designed to neutralize communications satellites. The system seems close to operational deployment.

Air-launched anti-satellite system: There seems to be development of a missile called Kornet, which is carried by a MiG-31. It can supposedly target satellites. Another possible anti-satellite weapon is a smaller missile system called Kosmos-2519, designed to be launched from space.

New weapons as response to INF Treaty collapse

Land-based Kalibr cruise missile: A land-based version of the proven high-precision Kalibr missile. It has a range up to 2,500 kilometers, so it is still illegal to make a ground-based launcher. But if the INF-treaty breaks down, Russia has stated intentions of making a ground-launched version really quickly.

Land-based Tsirkon hypersonic missile: A ground-launched version of the – not yet operational – naval cruise missile Tsirkon. This hypersonic missile apparently reaches a speed of Mach 9. The naval version is expected to be operational in the early 2020s, and a ground-launched version somewhat later. Tsirkon will probably use the same launcher as Kalibr, which makes development easier.

Random new weapon programs

Okhotnik strike UAV: A heavy long-range strike UAV. This is a top priority project which will fill a gap in Russia’s arsenal. Pictures of the Okhotnik appeared in January, and it does look like an impressive machine. The first flight tests are expected in the near future.

A picture of what is allegedly a prototype of the Okhotnik UAV. Photo: Unknown

Altair medium sized strike UAV: This project has been delayed because the producer lost their chief designer and had to transfer responsibility to a different company. But now it appears that things are moving ahead again, and that the first flight tests of Altair in its new form will take place later this year.

Su-57 Fifth generation fighter: The project is at a late stage of development with nine prototypes flying. Serial production will begin this year, and an upgraded version with a better engine is expected in 2023. This will allow supersonic cruising speed, which will make the Su-57 a true fifth generation fighter. However, production numbers will likely be very small because the plane is so expensive.

T-14 Armata tank: A prototype of this modern tank is in trial use in the army, and the first 12 of the serial production will arrive this year. Mass production is seriously challenged by high unit costs. It is much cheaper to upgrade T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks, and the added combat benefits of the Armata are not worth the higher price. Production costs could be reduced if Russia were to open the market for export orders, but usually they don’t like to do that before a product is in wide use domestically. So it remains to be seen whether Russia will eventually implement the Armata, begin exports, or it will become a stepping stone to a future tank at a more affordable price.

S-500 Prometei air-space defense system: S-500 is the successor to the much famed S-400. It has been reported that the system is ready for serial production, but at the same time it does not appear to be going very quickly. The most likely explanation is that there are technical problems with the 40N6M missile, which is to provide the long range of up to 600 kilometers. This is an improved version of the 40N6 missile, which was supposed to give the often quoted range of 400 kilometers for the S-400 system. The problem is that the missile for S-400 has been delayed so far, and it seems a fair guess that the extended version for S-500 is even more delayed.

S-350 Vityaz air defense system: This medium-range air defense system has been delayed many times, but now it appears close to delivery. It uses the same missiles as the naval air defense system Poliment-Redut. It was originally planned to replace the aging S-300 system, but with all the delays it is unclear what will come of it.

PAK DA strategic bomber: Russia’s future stealth aircraft that will replace the Tu-160 long-range strategic bomber. This project is seriously delayed, and it now seems unlikely that the PAK DA will fly operationally before the 2030s or even 2040s. The main reason for the delays appears to be high costs.

Lider-class destroyer: Russia’s largest warships are getting old, and the project 23560 Lider-class was intended as a successor. Originally it was conceptualized as a diesel-powered ship around 14,000 tons, but now it appears to have grown into a nuclear-powered 20,000 tons version instead. The reason for this is at least partly that foreign sanctions prevent Russia from providing reliable gas turbines. The number of expected hulls has also been reduced over the years from originally 12 to now just two.

Things may still change, though. The Lider-class is in very early development, and serious R&D is not planned to begin before 2021. It is unlikely that such a ship can be in service before the 2030s. If implemented, it will be a really large warship with more than a hundred Tsirkon, Kalibr, or Oniks missiles.

Another example of how we overrate Russia’s air defense weapons

2019-03-27 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Alex Lockie for Business Insider in a piece titled NATO will lose its next air war to Putin’s ‘formidable beasts’ if it waits for the F-35 to save it:

“If we think we’re going to wait for the next generation to sort the problems out, I can categorically tell you we will fail when next major conflict occurs.” Simon Rochelle, the Royal Air Force’s air vice-marshal, told the Royal United Service Institute’s Combat Air Survivability conference on Wednesday.

“In 2030, 80% of the European NATO forces – should one of those situations occur, God forbid – will be gen 4 fighters. You can’t walk away from that,” he continued, referring to pre-stealth jets as belonging to a fourth generation of fighters.

While Rochelle sounded confident in the F-35’s ability to meet current and future threats, he stressed that NATO wouldn’t hit critical mass in its fifth-generation fleets in time for the next big conflict.

This is hyperbole. Russia’s air defense technology is nowhere near as effective as the air vice-marshal paints it. I would recommend having a look at FOI’s new report on the overrated nature of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities.

Of course it is a good idea to upgrade 4th generation fighters with new technology. But there is no reason to get alarmist about it.

Lithuania buys additional NASAMS air defense missiles

2019-01-03 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Defence Blog:

Lithuania has decided to purchase an undisclosed number of additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) combat and inert missiles from Norway, according to the Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania.

It is hard to comment on an additional purchase of missiles, when you don’t know how many they bought or had already. But apparently the new deal does not mean that the combined costs of the project grow. They are still estimated to be about €110 million, which is roughly the same price that was announced in 2017 when Lithuania decided to invest in the NASAMS system. Or perhaps the additional contract was anticipated in the first cost estimate.

While the number of missiles is unknown, we do know that Lithuania plans to equip two batteries with two launchers each. Having the NASAMS medium range air defense system will dramatically improve the air defense capabilities for Lithuania. The system is expected to be fully implemented in 2021.

Chkalovsk air base in Kaliningrad reopens after expansion

2018-10-08 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The air base in Chkalovsk in Kaliningrad has been reopened after five years of reconstruction. This is one of the most important military airports for the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet. That reports the press service of the Western military district. This means that about 20 aircrews can relocate back to Chkalovsk from their temporary base in Chernyakhovsk.

Chkalovsk has received what appears to have been much needed maintenance, but it has also been expanded significantly. This means that it is an airport with greater capabilities that reopens. The runway, taxiways, and apron have been fitted with concrete surfaces, which permits operations with all modern civilian or military aircraft. The runway has been made longer from 2600 meters to 3100 meters, and it has been improved so it is possible to operate more than one aircraft at a time. Last year, an An-26 transport aircraft did a test landing on the runway, during which they also verified the new electronic navigation systems that have been installed. I have illustrated the improvements to the airport with this graphic where you can move the slider to compare the satellite images from 2012 and 2018.

In addition to the purely flight related improvements, the reconstruction also includes facilities for maintenance of aircraft and equipment to support their operations. I am not personally a master of satellite forensics, so I will not speculate too much about what we see in the zoomed out comparison graphic below. But clearly there has been a lot of building activity to the West and South of the airfield.

The airport in Chkalovsk is a good example of the improvements that the Russian military experiences these days. There is money for investments in the support structure, even whilst Russia is fighting two minor wars in Syria and Ukraine. The geographical location in Kaliningrad gives Chkalovsk a strategic significance, and with a larger airfield there is flexibility to increase the size of the air detachment in Kaliningrad or to have other types of aircraft visit on a rotational basis.

In general, the military aircraft in Kaliningrad are operated by the 72nd Aviation Base of the Baltic Fleet. Until now, they have worked from three different airfields, but it is expected that they will concentrate their forces in Chkalovsk in the future.

Israel has reckless attitude to safety, says Russia after Il-20 crash

2018-09-24 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The Russian Defense Ministry has published a detailed statement about the shoot down of an Il-20 intelligence aircraft in the Mediterranean off Syria last week. The aircraft was his by friendly fire from Syrian anti-aircraft batteries as they responded to an attack by Israeli F-16s.

In essence the briefing was a long accusation against Israel for reckless behavior and poor adherence to deconfliction procedures. The first half of the briefing was a minute by minute account of the events on 17 September that led to the crash of the Russian spy plane and the death of 15 airmen. The second half was a more general segment to show that Israel has a history of dangerous – and frankly ungrateful – behavior. The notion is that Russia’s actions in Syria – and especially in the Golan Heights – have improved security in Israel, so it would be appropriate with some goodwill in return.

According to Russia, Israel often neglects to use the established deconfliction channels before an attack. Russia has used the system 310 times to warn about upcoming military actions near Israeli territory. Israel, on the other hand, has only used the system 25 times, and usually they call so late that the air strike is already taking place. In the incident on 17 September, Russia only got the warning one minute ahead of the air strike, and it mistakenly indicated a wrong geographic location because the Israeli officer confused the Russian words for North and West.

Interestingly, the Russian Defense Ministry points out that their cooperation with the American authorities is outstanding when it comes to deconfliction of air operations. They basically suggest that the Israelis learn from the Americans how to behave professionally.

One party that does not get any blame from the Russians is Syria. This is noteworthy since it was a Syrian missile that shot down the Il-20. It does seem like a remarkable display of incompetence that the Syrian crew was unable to distinguish between a fighter jet and a large turboprop airliner.

When Russia chooses not to criticize Syria, one obvious explanation could be that Russia wants someone other than their ally to take the blame. You might as well exploit a situation when you have the opportunity, and if this can pause Israel’s air strikes for a while, that is a good thing for Russia. Another explanation is that Russia needs the Syrian air defense to look competent. They have routinely claimed that the Syrians shoot down an unbelievable number of missiles during air strikes, so they have to stick to a narrative where the Syrians are really good. And finally, S-200 is a Russian produced missile, and it is bad publicity if it shoots down the wrong airplanes.

But besides the reasons that Russia does not want to blame the Syrian government, they also seem genuinely unsatisfied with Israel’s behavior. The evidence that they have presented consists of bilateral exchanges between Israel and Russia, and if something is incorrect, it will be easy for Israel to refute. So it seems likely that the numbers do indeed confirm that Israel has a sloppy attitude to deconfliction during air strikes, and that Russia wants them to improve.

Russia crowns terrible PR week with new “evidence” about MH17 shoot-down

2018-09-18 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Yesterday, the Russian Ministry of Defense published what they call indisputable evidence that Ukrainian forces shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17).

Their press conference comes on top of a tough week for the Russian government. First, there was Viktor Zolotov’s embarrassing video rant, where the head of the national guard challenged opposition leader Alexei Navalny to a fist fight. Then there was the disastrous television appearance on RT of the men allegedly named Petrov and Boshirov. The two suspects in the poisoning of Sergey Skripal in Salisbury pleaded their innocence so unconvincingly that even RT editor Margarita Simonyan seemed to find their incoherence amusing. And finally, there was the gubernatorial election in Primorye, where election fraud was unusually blatant, and protests are unfolding.

Russians are of course aware of these things. The commentator Oleg Kashin has called it a “Week of national embarrassment” in republic.ru. He went on to speculate that perhaps there is a secret plot by a junta in the Kremlin to screw things up for Putin, because this level of incompetence is almost surreal.

So the Russian government was not exactly talking from a position of credibility, when they announced this new evidence about the downing of MH17.

What they actually revealed at the press conference was some more information about the BUK missile, which shot down MH17. Some apparently declassified documents show that this particular missile was inherited by Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also said that video footage showing the BUK launcher in Donbass on 17 July 2014 is falsified. And then they presented an audio recording from 2016 where a Ukrainian colonel talks about shooting down “another Malaysian Boeing”.

TV Rain has made a nice overview of the different Russian stories since the incident on 17 July 2014:

17 July 2014: Just after the incident, the Russian TV channel LifeNews reported that separatists in Donbass had successfully shot down another Ukrainian military transport aircraft.

17 July 2014: Russian media report that two Ukrainian military aircraft had flown next to MH17 when it was hit. The Defense Ministry demands that Ukraine explains this stunning coincidence. The information came from a Twitter account from an alleged Spanish air-traffic controller in Kiev. The Twitter account was later identified as fake, but nevertheless, Putin referred to the Spanish air-traffic controller in a conversation with movie director Oliver Stone.

18 July 2014: Russian Defense Ministry says that they have evidence that a Ukrainian Su-25 was in the same area as MH17.

November 2014: Russian Channel One shows sensational footage of a Ukrainian fighter jet attacking MH17.

End of 2015: Russian Defense Ministry stops talking about the theory of a Ukrainian fighter jet.

September 2016: The Dutch investigation team reveal evidence that MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile, which was launched near the village Pervomayske. According to Russia, the BUK missile was fired from Ukrainian territory near the village Zaroshchenshoye.

May 2018: The Dutch investigation team say the missile belonged to the 53rd air defense brigade in Kursk. The missile probably has the serial number 9D1318869032, which means that it was built in 1986. Russia says that it cannot be their missile because they retire missiles when they are 25 years old.

17 September 2018: Russia’s Ministry of Defense has a press briefing where they comment on the serial number. They claim this particular missile was handed over to Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

I will not go into a deep analysis of yesterday’s press briefing. I have included the Defense Ministry’s own explanation in English in the video at the bottom, so you can judge for yourself. I will say, though, that the Russian Ministry of Defense does not have a credible track record when it comes to explanations about MH17. I expect their newest evidence to be torn apart mercilessly over the coming weeks. Especially Bellingcat has done phenomenal work so far.

The initial reactions indicate that commentators are not overly impressed. The air transport expert Vadim Lukashevich notices that it took Russia four months to find the documents after the serial number was announced. That is a surprisingly long time. Also, they only presented documents from the factory, but nothing with a Ukrainian signature of receipt, which seems like a logical thing to get when shipping a missile. Finally, it is noted that missiles from this shipment were sold by Ukraine to Georgia in 2007, which means that even if Ukraine had this missile, Russia could have conquered it back during the August war in 2008. It also seems that their presented evidence for the falsification of video footage of the missile launcher in Donetsk on 17 July 2014 is easy to dismiss. They draw some colorful lines on a few frames to show that the BUK launcher has been manipulated into place, but their logic for what can be concluded from these lines seems faulty.

So in other words, it looks like the Russian government finishes off a terrible week in public relations with a fourth shot in the foot.

Russian Ministry of Defense releases data on Syria campaign

2018-08-28 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The Russian Ministry of Defense has published a video containing interesting details about the campaign in Syria. In a fashion typical of Russian journalism the video is saturated with factual data in rapid order. Fortunately the blog bpmd has put the most interesting numbers in writing, which makes it easier to digest.

The statistics are interesting for two reason. First, these are official numbers, so that gives them some credibility. And second, the numbers reflect that the Russian military has gained tremendous combat experience in Syria. Russia has consciously rotated personnel and equipment with the purpose of maximizing organizational learning.

So here are some of the data points in no particular order:

Since 2015 a total of 63,012 military personnel have participated in the operations in Syria. This includes no less than 434 generals and 25,738 officers.
Combat experience received:
- 4,349 specialists of the missile forces and artillery
- 87 percent of the crews of operational-tactical aviation
- 91 percent of the crews of army aviation
- 97 percent of the crews of transport aviation
- 60 percent of the crews of strategic long-range aviation
One in four soldiers who served in Syria received a decoration for their service.
The Air Force completed 39,000 combat sorties of which 20,000 were during night conditions. During the most intensive phases the number of sorties reached more than 100 per day. Each plane conducted three to four sorties per day.The highest number of sorties was on 20 November 2015 when planes took off 139 times.
The Navy completed 189 expeditions in which 86 surface warships, 14 submarines, and 83 other vessels have participated.
The carrier Admiral Kuznetsov launched 420 sorties including 117 at night. 1,252 objects were destroyed as a result.
UAVs have done more than 25,000 flights and discovered 47,522 enemy objects. Drones of the types Forpost and Orlan-10 have done up to 70 flights every day.
The have been 100 attacks with maritime launched cruise missiles and 66 attacks with air launched cruise missiles.
Long-range bombers of the type Tu-22M3 have completed 369 sorties, engaged in attacks 47 times, and destroyed 215 objects.
A total of 121,466 enemy objects have been destroyed by air raids and cruise missiles. This includes 970 field camps, 20,513 logistical points, 9,941 stocks of ammunition and fuel, and 8,927 cars with anti-aircraft equipment.
The kill count is 830 terrorist leaders and more than 86,000 enemy fighters including 4,500 from Russia or other SNG countries.
Logistical support has included 424 maritime and 2,785 air transports. Maritime transports have provided 3,250 persons, 4,501 pieces of military equipment, and 1,559,000 tons of goods. Air transport has moved 91,285 persons, more than 1,000 pieces of military equipment, and 55,846 tons of goods. On average Russia has delivered 2,000 tons of different goods to Syria every day.
On the medical front, 10 medical units and a total of 1,220 military medics have given care to 88,318 Syrians.
6,077 tons of food and provisions have been parachuted over Syria.
The Syrian Armed Forces have received 4,710 pieces of weapons and equipment and more than 1,100 tons of armored vehicles.
231 types of equipment were tested and approved during the campaign. This includes 68 from the Air Force, 18 from the Navy, 48 from the Army, and 97 from other agencies including special forces.

Some of these numbers are necessarily less certain than others. The number of killed enemies, for example, will invariably be an estimate. These numbers strike me as surprisingly high, so it seems likely that the Russian Ministry of Defense has chosen an optimistic view. Nevertheless, the data is interesting and shows that the Russian military has considered Syria not only from a perspective of campaign objectives but also as an opportunity to gain combat experience for both personnel and equipment.

U.S. approves sale of four Black Hawk helicopters to Latvia

2018-08-04 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The U.S. State Department has approved the sale of four Black Hawk helicopters to Latvia for an estimated sum of $200 million.

The sale of these UH-60 helicopters to Latvia will significantly increase its capability to provide troop lift, border security, anti-terrorist, medical evacuation, search and rescue, re-supply/external lift, and combat support in all weather. Latvia intends to use these helicopters to modernize its armed forces and expand its existing Army architecture in its efforts to provide multi-mission support in the region. Latvia will have no difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.

This does not necessarily mean that Latvia will buy these helicopters. The approval is a necessary step before the negotiations can continue, and the actual deal could be for a smaller number or a lower sum.

But if Latvia actually buys Black Hawk helicopters, it will be a dramatic improvement for the country. At present the Latvian air force has few actual aircraft. They have one small An-2T transport biplane, one Mi-2 (Hoplite) helicopter, and four Mi-17 (Hip) helicopters.

The Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk is a good helicopter with a proven history of service. In 2011, Sweden made a quick decision to buy Black Hawk helicopters because of endless delays with their new NH90 helicopters. Already two years later, Swedish Black Hawks were flying operationally in Afghanistan.

What Russia learned from the air campaign in Syria

2018-07-02 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

It is hard to overestimate how much experience the Russian military has gained from the war in Syria. It has been a perfect stage for testing and adjusting concepts and new equipment.

Anton Lavrov has taken a look at the air campaign in this report for CNA. There are some really interesting findings, and since most people won’t find the time to read the whole report, I thought I’d make a summary.

I want to add a comment about the reliability of Lavrov’s sources. The report is largely based on data from news articles or public statements from the Russian government. I think Lavrov does a good job of aggregating and analyzing the information, but please treat it with the same sound skepticism that you would treat the original source.

But with that word of caution, on to the summary of some interesting points about Russia’s lessons from the air campaign in Syria.

Background for Russia’s air campaign in Syria

When Russia engaged in Syria, the aerospace forces had not been in a real war for about 15 years. The last time was the air campaign in Chechnya which ended in 2000. They were shortly engaged in Georgia in 2008, but that short war included fewer than 200 air strikes. Since then, the Russian armed forces had undergone a major technical modernization. From 2008 to 2015 they received:

More than 350 new combat planes.
About 1,000 new helicopters.
Hundreds of new and modern air defense systems.
Technical upgrades of older aircraft with interesting new equipment like the SVP-24 Gefest guidance system which allegedly would give remarkable precision with otherwise unguided munitions.

To this comes substantial reorganizing as part of the military reforms. In fact, the Russian Aerospace Forces had been formed only about a month before the campaign in Syria began through a merger of the Air Force and the Aerospace Defense Forces.

So the Russian Aerospace Forces needed practical experience when the Syria campaign began in 2015.

Optimizing numbers of engagements per sortie

During the first month of the Russian air campaign in Syria, the 32 deployed combat aircraft at Khmeimim air base carried out 1,292 combat missions on 1,623 targets.

Initially, the number of targets hit was approximately half the number of sorties. This indicates that the strikes were carried out in the traditional Russian fashion with pairs of aircraft attacking the same target. After some time they changed to single aircraft missions to increase the number of targets that could be covered per day. Within about four months they had improved the efficiency even further so one aircraft could cover more than one target during a sortie. This increased the number of targets to about three to four times the number of sorties.

Su-24M front-line bomber. Photo: Alexander Mishin

This demonstrates a remarkable refinement of tactics. By switching to single aircraft missions and by using more complex flight plans, they were able to achieve a six to eight times increase in the number of engaged targets per sortie.

Unguided bombs would remain the most important munition

It quickly became clear that unguided bombs would be the primary ammunition for the bombing campaign. Russia has done a lot to advertise their precision-guided missiles in Syria, but by far the greatest number of deployed weapons have been unguided.

The SVP-24 Gefest guidance system, which essentially is a computer that drops the unguided bomb automatically based on careful calculations of ballistic and meteorological data, proved to be reasonably precise. The accuracy suffered from a requirement of aircraft to stay above an altitude of 4 kilometers, so Russia did not achieve the same kind of precision that a guided missile would give. But it appears that SVP-24 performed as well as can be expected given the altitude restrictions.

Russia utilized a tactic where targets were observed with UAVs during the strike, and if the unguided bomb missed the target, the bomber aircraft would repeat the strike about five to six minutes later. This close coordination of air operations between manned aircraft and drones was new for the Russian military.

Development of force structure

The number and types of deployed aircraft fluctuated throughout the campaign. As a general trend there were between 20 and 40 fighter aircraft of different kinds stationed at Khmeimim. In the beginning, most of the sorties were flown with older Su-24Ms, but gradually more modern types of aircraft began to take over.

Long range bombers like Tu-95MS (Bear) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) participated in the campaign at times of increased intensity. They were operated from bases on Russian territory. Combat and transport helicopters were also used after the initial bombing campaign – in the beginning for protection of the bases but later also for offensive action.

In total, Russia lost seven planes and 12 helicopters from September 2015 to May 2018. More than 34,000 combat sorties were carried out from September 2015 to January 2018, averaging 42 per day. At peak times, Russia conducted more than 100 sorties per day, and over longer periods of time they seemed capable of sustaining 70-80 daily missions. That was two to three flights per airplane, and since some aircraft were out for maintenance that was three to four daily sorties per operable aircraft.

That is a high number which was achieved by having at least two crews per aircraft and significantly more technicians than the standard number at home.

A somewhat surprising restraint to the possible number of sorties was Russia’s ability to find enough relevant targets to hit. At times of very high intensity, the quality of target allocation suffered. For example, during a retaliation campaign against ISIS for the terrorist attack on Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 in October 2015, there was a large number of confirmed errors. Quite simply, the demand for things to blow up was so big that there wasn’t time to double check information about possible targets.

The role of fighter planes

From the start, Russia enjoyed undisputed freedom in the air. As long as they stayed above a given altitude, they were safe from the few man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that the opposition had. That gave freedom to use all the different kinds of fighter planes in the role of bombers during the initial bombing campaign.

As the operation progressed, the complexity also increased. Russian forward air controllers were integrated with the Syrian ground forces or Russian mercenaries (private contractors), and planes started to provide air support during the fight rather than merely hitting stationary targets that had been predesignated.

When a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24M in November 2015, Russia had to rethink its role and approach to air defense. Fighters were equipped with self defense air-to-air missiles, and a more clear division of labor was introduced so the fighters were mostly used for air patrols and escorts of attack aircraft instead of bombing. Ground based air defenses were also improved with the introduction of S-400 in Syria.

Around the same time, deconfliction measures between Russia and the U.S. were introduced to guarantee the safety of air operations.

Deployment of Admiral Kuznetsov

In 2016, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed to the mission. Russia had never before used carrier-based aviation in real combat, so it was a good opportunity to test the concept.

The deployment of Kuznetsov was mostly intended to satisfy the navy. The Russian Navy has ambitious dreams about new aircraft carriers, and a successful contribution by Kuznetsov in Syria would further that case.

The Admiral Kuznetsov campaign was an utter failure. The carrier-based fighters delivered substantially less air time than the aircraft based in Khmeimim. Together, the 15 fighters from the carrier could only make eight to nine sorties per day. Two fighters crashed during landings. After some time it was decided to move Kuznetsov’s aircraft to Khmeimim air base to stop the ongoing disaster.

Russia has withdrawn three times

A somewhat curious phenomenon is that Vladimir Putin from time to time declares victory and orders a withdrawal of Russian troops.

First time he did this was in March 2016, apparently out of a desire to reduce the commitment and avoid mission creep. The number of planes at Khmeimim was reduced from 44 to 24, and it took until the end of the year before the composition of the Khmeimim air group changed again. In the meantime, however, the air campaign continued, Russia still conducted long range bombing raids from Russian or Iranian bases, and they deployed Admiral Kuznetsov to the region.

The second withdrawal was announced in December 2016 after the capture of Aleppo. It was basically an excuse for an early recall of Admiral Kuznetsov. Putin announced the third withdrawal in December 2017. This time, Russia withdrew around half their aircraft, but the fighting didn’t stop.

It seems that Russia uses public announcements of withdrawal as a tool to control the commitment and to give the appearance of progress.

Rapid crew rotations

A final point is that Russia not only tested new equipment and developed ned doctrines in Syria. They have also methodically made sure that as much personnel as possible would gain personal war experience. An astonishing 80 percent of Russia’s tactical aviation crews and 95 percent of army aviation helicopter crews have flown at least 100-120 sorties in Syria. This was possible through a scheme of rapid rotations.

Conclusion

When the air campaign in Syria began in 2015, the Russian Aerospace Forces had much new equipment and a new organization, but they had little practical experience on which to base their doctrines. Throughout the campaign, Russia has refined tactics and principles, and they have demonstrated a capability to deliver sustained air power with relatively modest means.

The Russians have skillfully exploited the opportunity to test all kinds of equipment and rotate personnel so everybody would get real war experience.