Romeo Squared

Defense with a Baltic edge

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Some thoughts on HMS Dragon’s FONOPS off Crimea

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Last week, first deputy director of FSB and leader of Russia’s border control service Vladimir Kulishov made some noticeable comments to RIA Novosti about an incident in October 2020 involving the British destroyer HMS Dragon.

The British warship crossed the territorial waters off Crimea in what must be characterized as a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOPS). This fact has been know for some time. In December, deputy minister of defense Alexander Fomin revealed that the British warship had crossed into Russian territorial waters1 off Crimea close to Sevastopol, but he didn’t give much further information.

But according to Kulishov, it was a rather intense encounter between HMS Dragon and units from the Russian coastguard (FSB), navy and air force. As he explained to RIA Novosti:

“On 13 October, the British anti-air destroyer D35 Dragon entered Russian territorial waters close to the tip Khersones in the Black Sea, claiming the right to innocent passage. They did this despite receiving warnings that it would be illegal to enter Russian territorial waters. Upon receiving directions to leave Russian territory immediately, the captain of the destroyer claimed there was a bad radio connection. As a result …Continue reading

Interview with Corporal Frisk about military reductions in UK

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I recently published an interview on YouTube with the Finnish defense blogger Robin Häggblom aka Corporal Frisk about the United Kingdom’s new integrated review and the plans for force adjustments outlined in the Defence in a competitive age report.

Robin Häggblom wrote an insightful and critical analysis on his blog, where he raised many question marks about the details in the plan. Ostensibly, the goal is to create mobile, deployable, and lethal forces that will support a “Global Britain” approach to warfighting. Beneath the surface there seem to be many inconsistencies, though, and one could fear that the result will be weaker and less coherent capabilities.

I asked Robin if he would elaborate on his thoughts in an interview, and the was this video:

As a sidenote, one of the reasons this blog hasn’t received so much attention lately is that I have been busy with a podcast and a YouTube channel. It’s a lot of fun, but unfortunately time is a limited resource and there just hasn’t been enough time for everything.

Since both the podcast and the YouTube videos have been in Danish, there has been little potential for cross-posting content. That might change now that I have discovered YouTube’s subtitle function. I intend to post regular new videos in English, and I trust that YouTube’s algorithms will make sure only to suggest content in the right language for subscribers. So feel free to subscribe to my channel on YouTube if you are interested.

A look at the Baltic Fleet and the defense of Kaliningrad

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Last week an article was published in Izvestia looking at the Russian defense of Kaliningrad. The article was written by Dmitriy Boltenkov, and while providing an interesting view on Russia’s approach to the defense of the enclave, it also doubles as an almost caricatured example of a distorted world view that unfortunately typifies much defense journalism in Russia.

I thought it would be interesting to take a closer look at the article, beginning with what it says about the Russian military in Kaliningrad. This also gives an opportunity to give an update on the Baltic Fleet. I recently published a long article in Danish about the Russian Baltic Fleet, and I have wanted to write something about it in English as well.

First it is highlighted that Kaliningrad has served as a valuable learning ground for joint operations. All the forces in Kaliningrad are under command of the Baltic Fleet. This means that the Baltic Fleet can better be understood as a joint command than as a naval organization. In addition to the joint forces in Kaliningrad, the Baltic Fleet also commands the Leningrad Naval Base, which has branches in different locations around Saint Petersburg. The experiences from Kaliningrad have informed the decision to create similar force compositions in Kamchatka and the Arctic, and it functioned as an early example of the unified command structure that would become the basis of the current system of military districts.

Kaliningrad was also – according to this article – the first place that Russia established an A2/AD zone. This is a noteworthy statement, because increasingly Western analysis has begun to reject the notion that Russia has an A2/AD strategy. Michael Kofman has pointed out that A2/AD is not a concept in Russian military thought, and personally I have called it a myth. If anything, I would say that the Bastion concept in the Arctic and the Far East is the original implementation of something akin to A2/AD, but Boltenkov seems convinced that it was first developed in the Baltic region. This, allegedly, gives Kaliningrad a strong defense against the preferred Western tactic of massive air bombardments to shape a battlefield.

Naval Assets and Missiles

Then the article moves on to describing the naval strength of the Baltic Fleet. There is nothing super surprising about it, but it gives a nice overview. The four Steregushchiy-class corvettes are mentioned, and it is highlighted that they are blue water capable vessels that regularly operate in the Atlantic and even have made it all the way to the Red Sea. It is also mentioned that in the near future one of them, either Retivy or Strogiy, will be upgraded with the new Zaslon radar system – a detail that I was not aware of.

Boikiy
The Steregushchiy-class corvette Boikiy during a transit of the Danish Straits in June 2019. Photo: Thomas Nilsson

Then Boltenkov turns to the larger warships and mentions that the frigate Yaroslav Mudry is on a long deployment and currently is to be found around the coasts of South Africa. They were supposed to visit Cape Town, but due to the fear of coronavirus the small group consisting of Yaroslav Mudry, the tanker Yelna, and the tugboat Viktor Konetskiy had to make do with throwing anchor outside the city. This sounds like a disappointment for the crews who had made it all the way to South Africa and probably were hoping for some nice days at shore. The group left Kaliningrad on October 1st, and around New Years they made world headlines for participating in a combined exercise with the Chinese and Iranian navies close to the Strait of Hormuz. Boltenkov also mentions the two other large warships from the Baltic Fleet, namely the destroyer Nastoichivy and the frigate Neustrashimy. He explains that both ships are set to rejoin the fleet in the coming years when their repairs are completed. This is a (not very) surprising timeline. Last winter it was boldly announced that both ships would reenter service quickly, but since then we haven’t heard more about it. It seemed clear that the projects had been struck by delays.

The trademark of the Baltic Fleet is small corvettes, and some of them are new and modern. They have two Buyan-M class and two Karakurt-class corvettes, and both of these types are equipped with Kalibr missiles. They also have a rather large collection of various Soviet era corvettes. The Baltic Fleet also sports amphibious capabilities, namely four rather large Ropucha-class ships and two Zubr-class hovercraft. The Zubr-class is an interesting vessel that looks spectacular on video when it sails around on the beaches. It also has minelaying capabilities. One point that I do want to make here is that the term “amphibious” often sounds more threatening than it actually is. It gives an image of Russian soldiers landing on beaches of Baltic islands. In reality the Ropuchas are mostly used for general transportation of supplies, and the Baltic Fleet has contributed to the so-called Syrian Express with these ships.

One noticeable shortage in the Baltic Fleet is submarines. They only have one old Kilo-class, and Boltenkov specifically mentions the much larger German and Swedish submarine fleets in the same area. He also notes that submarines from the Northern Fleet regularly make the trip to the Baltic Sea in order to assist with the sea trials when shipyards in Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad produce new warships that need to test their ASW equipment.

Aside from the ships, Boltenkov also finds reason to mention the 152nd Guard Missile Brigade equipped with Iskander-M missiles and the 25th Coastal Missile Brigade with Bastion and Bal anti-ship missiles. These weapons provide a powerful ground-based missile threat on great distances. There are also strong artillery systems in Kaliningrad like the Uragan multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS), Msta and Pion howitzers, and Khrisantema anti-tank missiles.

The article mentions that all this adds up to a combined salvo size of 96 Uragan rockets, 32 Kalibr missiles, 24 Iskander-M missiles, and 20 Bastion missiles. Boltenkov describes this as the first salvo, but it seems unlikely that they could easily reload for a second one of the same size.

Air Power and Electronic Warfare

Kaliningrad is well equipped with air defense weapons. The 44th Air Defense Division has regiments with S-400 and S-300V4 respectively, and the 22nd Guards Air Defense Regiment has short-range Tor-M2 systems. Boltenkov claims that in addition to this there is another 8-10 air defense divisions with S-400, S-300, or S-300V4. I have been unable to verify these numbers, but that is a lot. This means that the air defense of Kaliningrad is comparable to that of Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

There is also a quite strong presence of aircraft. It is technically called naval aviation because it is part of the Baltic Fleet, but in practice it is hard to distinguish from what the Air Force would deliver. The 132nd Air Division consists of a fighter regiment, a bomber regiment, and a helicopter regiment. Kaliningrad is also well-equipped with electronic warfare equipment. For example they have giant the Murmansk-BN jammer, which can interrupt short wave radiocommunications on ranges large enough to cover all of Europe.

Voronezh-DM radar
The Voronezh-DM early warning radar in Kaliningrad while it was still under construction in 2011. It provides over-the-horizon coverage out to several thousand kilometers. This is obviously not a mobile installation, so one has to wonder how long Russia expects it to remain undamaged in case of a war. Photo: Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia

The location of Kaliningrad also means that it is valuable for strategic air surveillance. There is located a Voronezh-DM missile early warning radar in the enclave, and soon there will also be positioned a 29B6 Container over-the-horizon radar which will be able to see the take-off of aircraft or the launch of missiles as far away as the United Kingdom or the Mediterranean.

What is so annoying about this article?

Boltenkov provides a nice roundup of the Baltic Fleet and the defense composition in Kaliningrad. But what does all this have to do with the British Royal Navy, you might ask? Or maybe you did not ask that question, because actually there isn’t any obvious connection, and it doesn’t make sense to connect these two things.

But Boltenkov just can’t resist doing it anyways, and this is where this article becomes a caricature of politicized Russian defense journalism. In late March, a group of Russian ships – including five ships from the Baltic Fleet – lingered around in the English Channel for some days, and this was mentioned in the British press. I sometimes think the British over-dramatize these events, but in this case the Royal Navy actually made a fairly calm statement about it. But in Boltenkov’s article this is described as borderline panic on the part of the British, who were scared by a group of three corvettes and two amphibious vessels. Conveniently his article does not mention the two Admiral Grigorovich class frigates from the Black Sea Fleet, because that would have ruined the story that the British are afraid of small corvettes from the Baltic.

After ridiculing the British for being terrified by small Russian warships, Boltenkov moves on to explaining how the West is super-aggressive. He states that exercises like Cold Response and Defender Europe 2020 call for a response1, so nobody should be surprised that the Russians would send a group of warships to monitor. Boltenkov also notes the vulnerable position of Kaliningrad “surrounded by governments with anti-Russian policies”, and whose politicians “frequently express the desire to annex the territory of Russia’s westernmost oblast”. NATO builds military infrastructure in the Baltic States and Poland, who renew their arsenals and buy new artillery and missile systems. Soldiers from Western countries rotate through the region, and one NATO exercise takes place after the other. Also, intelligence aircraft from NATO countries and Sweden are practically stuck on the borders of Kaliningrad.

According to Boltenkov, it is self-evident that the Russian government has to do something to protect Kaliningrad. So this tirade functions as the introduction to an otherwise useful and interesting article about the Russian military forces in Kaliningrad.

As a Western observer, it is easy to be confused: At once, we are portrayed as weak and scared, but also as strong and aggressive. In a Russian context these two narratives can work together by applying the always convenient explanation of Russophobia. According to this theory, everyone is both afraid of and opposed to Russia at the same time, so it makes sense that the British would be scared of a few corvettes while also plotting to attack Kaliningrad. But for a Western audience it just sounds like a ludicrous conspiracy theory.

  1. Boltenkov’s article is a good reminder not to underestimate the importance of large exercises as deterring mechanisms. He is obviously impressed. ↩

Russia’s military budget has nothing to do with the GDP of Spain

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The size and durability of Russia’s defense budget and economy in general is a source of much debate. One particular figure that I often encounter is that Russia has an equivalent GDP to Spain. The meaning apparently is that a country the size of Spain cannot sustain an armed force to compete for world leadership in the long run.

For example, Danish rear admiral Nils Wang uses the Spain trope in this interview to OLFI before his retirement as chief of the Danish Defense Academy. Wang presents the case that the military tensions between NATO and Russia are not comparable to the Cold War because with a GDP the size of Spain’s, Russia will not be able to hold territory in Western Europe after an initial occupation.

There are a few problems with this line of reasoning. First, historically the USSR never had an impressive GDP either. There are many complicating factors when comparing economies of different countries, especially when one of them has a fundamentally different economic system like the communist one. But in general, it seems that in second half of the 20th century, the Soviet Union had a GDP which was smaller than the combined GDP of West Germany and France. The combined GDP of all NATO countries beat the Soviet GDP by many lengths.

Another problem with the Spain comparison is that things don’t cost the same in different countries. In some places you just get more for your money than in others. It is cheaper to have a large army if the wages are low and equipment is inexpensive. To account for that, you need to correct the GDPs for purchasing power parity (PPP) before comparing different countries.

Nominally, the GDPs of Russia and Spain are roughly in the same ballpark. In 2017, Russia was number 12 in the world with a GDP of 1,527,469 million USD, and Spain was number 14 with a GDP of 1,313,951 million USD. So Russia’s GDP was about 14 percent larger than Spain’s in 2017. But if the numbers are corrected for purchasing power parity, Russia is number 6 in the world, just a tiny bit behind Germany and well ahead of both the United Kingdom, France, or Spain. Russia’s GDP (PPP) was 4,007,831 million Int$, and Germany’s was 4,170,790 million Int$. (Source: IMF)

The very similar GDPs (PPP) between Russia and Germany give room for an interesting perspective: Their defense spendings as percent of GDP indicate the same amount of stuff that one could buy for that money.1

In 2017, Germany spent 44.3 billion USD on defense which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP. Russia spent 66.3 billion USD, which was 4.3 percent of GDP (source: SIPRI). But because their GDPs with corrections for purchasing power parity are the same, Germany would have to increase their defense spending to 4.3 percent of GDP or 158.7 billion USD to afford the same investments as Russia.

Since playing with numbers is so much fun, I decided correct the defense budgets of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom for purchasing power parity and see how that compares to Russia’s military spending. With a GDP (PPP) of 4,007,831 million Int$ and a defense share of GPD of 4.3 percent, Russia’s defense planners had 172,336.7 million Int$ to spend in 2017. The other countries scored as follows:

Calculation of PPP corrected defense spending

In other words, corrected for purchasing power, Russia has a larger military budget than Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined. Because graphs are fun too, I also illustrated this point.

Defense spending (PPP)
Corrected for purchasing power, Russia has a larger military budget than Germany, France, and the UK combined.

Recently, there have been reports that Russia’s military budget declined by 20 percent in 2017 compared to 2016. Some have argued that this decline was inevitable given the poor condition of Russia’s economy. But as Michael Kofman has explained, Russia’s military budget is neither declining nor unsustainable. Instead, the apparent decline in defense spending in 2017 is due to technicalities like periodization of expenses in the national budget. Indicators suggest a stable level of defense spending which is sustainable in the long run in terms of manpower, materiel, and money.

So while Russia does have a GDP the size of Spain’s, that doesn’t say much about their military potential. More interestingly, Russia has a defense budget which gives them the same purchasing power as the combined military spending of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. And they can afford to keep it up in the foreseeable future.

  1. As Oliker has pointed out, there are many complicating factors when comparing defense spending across borders. For example, it is different what countries include as defense expenses. If anything, such a consideration would only strengthen the argument in this article. European countries have incentives to make their defense spending appear higher than it really is, whereas Russia has incentives to make it appear lower. ↩

Who cheated whom in Russian-British submarine duel?

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After the missile attack in Syria on 13 April, The Times reported that Russian naval forces successfully managed to suppress a British nuclear submarine which prevented it from launching its Tomahawk missiles. Supposedly, one or two Kilo-class submarines, two frigates, and an anti-submarine aircraft made it too difficult and dangerous for the British Astute-class nuclear submarine to move within firing distance from its targets in Syria. Allegedly the British submarine got support from American P-8 Orion maritime patrol aircraft which were tasked to track Russian surface and subsurface naval units.

Unsurprisingly, Russian media picked up the story. However, they cited the British story and did not provide more details from Russian sources.

Astute submarine
Astute class submarine. Photo: Royal Navy.

The whole story is a bit strange, and Michael Peck asked the apt question in The National Interest, Did Russia’s Diesel Submarines Really Hunt Down a British Nuclear Sub? Peck’s analysis focuses mostly on the technical feasibility of such an endeavor. Traditional military calculation would argue that the nuclear submarine has the best odds in a duel, even though the Kilo-class is a worthy competitor. Peck concludes that we just don’t know whether the Russian ships actually tracked down the British submarine, and that we also don’t know whether this prevented the British submarine from launching its weapons.

My take on this is that I don’t think the point of the submarine was to fire any missiles in the first place. Often a submarine is deployed not to deliver weapons but to keep the adversary busy. The mere knowledge that there is a submarine in the area forces the opponent to commit resources to finding it.

I guess that the United Kingdom sent the Astute submarine to keep track of the Russian ships in the area. A well placed news leak made sure that everyone knew about the presence of the submarine. Russian threats to shoot down both missiles and launch sites in case of an attack on Syria didn’t matter much because the submarine wouldn’t be a launch site.

That would have made it the job of the submarine commander to draw as many resources as possible from the Russian pursuers. In other words to be challenging yet achievable.

I don’t know whether this is what happened. But it does seem more plausible than the notion that the Royal Navy hit a streak of bad luck and had their mission blown by an unfortunate news leak and a masterfully executed Russian ASW-operation.

Warship diplomacy: British intervention in the Baltic from 1800-1801

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For those interested in history, I recommend this article by Jason Lancaster on CIMSEC about the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801.

It was a naval battle where the British fleet defeated the Danish. The story is fascinating. Greed and poor political decisions had led Denmark into a dilemma between choosing a war with Britain or losing the protective support of Russia that kept Sweden from annexing Norway. Denmark chose the war with Britain, fully aware that they would lose.

It is also a story about how the leadership qualities of state rulers matter. Both Paul I of Russia and Gustav IV Adolf of Sweden were eccentric figures, borderline crazy with a fascination for war and an idea of making their nation great again.

HMS Ocean retired and sold to Brazil

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HMS Ocean was retired from the Royal Navy today. The helicopter carrier officially left service at a ceremony at HM Naval Base Devonport with the participation of Queen Elizabeth.

HMS Ocean
HMS Ocean. Photo: Royal Navy

Ocean has been the flagship of the Royal Navy since it was commissioned into service in 1998. Now she will be handed off to Brazil for the price of £84 million.

The role as flagship will be taken over by the new aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales. However, the first one will not be operational until 2020.

I had the personal privilege of serving as a liaison officer to Ocean during a port stay in Copenhagen back in 2003. For a young Danish naval officer it was quite an experience to stand on the huge helicopter deck.

Comparison between U.S. and U.K. naval officer training

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There is an interesting comparison of U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Officer Training in the March edition of Proceedings. Dr. Anthony Wells has experience from both navies and insights into their training programs.

In short, Wells is not impressed by the U.S. seamanship education. He suggests the U.S. Navy can learn a lot from their British counterparts.

I wholeheartedly agree. My critical review of U.S. warship collisions was far from flattering for the U.S. Navy. It can only be described as irresponsible to have people in charge of large ships without proper education in seamanship and navigation.

My own anecdotal experience with the Royal Navy and the seamanship of British officers is that they are very competent.

Nuclear weapons aren’t actually a deterrent on their own

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Mark Galeotti makes an interesting point in this post on War on the Rocks titled Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent Isn’t a Military Asset, and Shouldn’t Be Funded as One.

The financial aspect of the argument is less interesting than the military point. Galeotti argues that two expensive projects, namely the two new aircraft carriers with accompanying F-35s and the nuclear deterrent, tie up so much of the defense budget that it causes disproportionate harm to other capabilities. If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the defense budget to some other post in the national budget, there would be more money left for other military projects. I lack the insight to see how this would be different from just increasing the defense budget, if the problem is that the national economy is sluggish.

But the military point is really good: Credible deterrence requires available assets that are relevant for the possible conflict scenarios. Nobody can imagine that the United Kingdom would use the Trident missiles in response to a limited military confrontation, so it is not a useful deterrent.

The British nuclear missiles are based on submarines, and the new Dreadnought-class, the replacement of the Vanguard-class, will be extremely expensive to build and maintain. They will be a valuable political instrument for the United Kingdom, but they will not be a replacement for other military assets.

So it comes down to the point that if the United Kingdom wants expensive military equipment to serve a specific political goal, they should acknowledge that there is a cost involved. Cutting the parts of the military that actually create deterrence is a really dumb strategy.

UK without anti-ship missiles for a decade

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Robert Beckhusen for War is Boring:

In 2010, Britain’s sailing branch opted not to replace the Harpoon, and one year ago it was revealed the missiles were set to retire at the end of 2018. In September 2017, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly announced that the U.K. Ministry of Defense has delayed the retirement until 2020.

That buys the Royal Navy some time — but not much. Fundamentally, the situation hasn’t changed. The Harpoon is already obsolete and terribly outranged, which is why the United States is preparing the new 200-mile-range LRASM to replace it. But no new missile is expected for the Royal Navy until possibly 2030 when the Perseus missile by European developer MBDA is complete.

The Perseus missile is promising but the thing is that it won’t actually exist for another 15 years or so. The UK must find some anti-ship missiles somewhere to fill in the gap, because having none is just ridiculous.