Navy

How China modernized its fishing fleet in the South China Sea

2021-05-04 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Ryan D. Martinson in a piece titled Xi likes big boats (coming soon to a reef near you) on War on the Rocks:

Photos the Philippine government released in March show nests of Chinese fishing vessels moored in the lagoon of the disputed reef. Aside from the sheer number of craft present, one is struck by the size of individual vessels. Satellite images reveal many boats 60 meters (almost 200 feet) in length — dwarfing the Philippine Coast Guard vessel (BRP Cabra) sent to monitor their activities.
Chinese fishers did not buy these boats out of mere love for Xi. Even if that were their motive, they could not afford these expensive craft without some help. Rather, the more than 200 fishing vessels seen congregating at Whitsun Reef are largely a product of policies that China has designed to prioritize Spratly fishing vessels in a national program to modernize the country’s fishing industry. This program has provided China’s maritime militia with potent new tools with which to exert influence and control in disputed maritime space — posing significant new challenges for Southeast Asian states.

Fascinating account of how China under Xi’s leadership around 2012 initiated a massive upgrade of its fishing fleet in the South China Sea. Small wooden boats have been replaced by massive steel-hulled ships that dwarf the coastguard vessels of neighboring states.

Obviously, these “fishing” ships are organized in China’s Maritime Militia, which arguably is a hybrid force designed to challenge the rule of international law in the South China Sea. It is worrisome that both China and Russia seem to have their crosshairs fixed on UNCLOS.

Russia challenges international law with Black Sea prohibition zones

2021-04-26 By Anders Puck Nielsen 1 Comment

Over the last month we witnessed a massive Russian mobilization on the Ukrainian borders. The exact purpose of the show of force is still uncertain, but the immediate risk of war seems to be over as most of the soldiers are now back in their barracks. However, the closed areas in the Black Sea that Russia established remain in place.

There has been much confusion as to what exactly it is that Russia is doing with these zones. For example there are reports like this one saying that the Kerch Strait is closed for Ukrainian vessels, while others say that the Kerch Strait will stay open. So I thought it would be useful to look into the question.

What is Russia doing?

Russia has announced that from 24 April until 31 October 2021, the right to innocent passage of Russian territorial waters is suspended for foreign warships and other state ships in three defined zones in the Black Sea. The coordinates are listed on page 28 in the Russian navigational warnings 17/21.

I have marked the three zones in the image below. As can be seen, one of the zones covers the southern approaches to the Kerch Strait. This means that in practical terms the Kerch Strait is closed for Ukrainian warships and other government ships. The two other zones cover the westernmost and southernmost areas of Crimea.

Prohibited zones off Crimea — The areas that Russia says are closed for foreign warships and government vessels. Map from OpenSeaMap.org.

Innocent passage is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) articles 17-19. The gist is that all ships have the right to navigation through the territorial sea of another state. The passage must take place in a continuous and expeditious manner, and it is not allowed to engage in activities other than those related to the passage such as weapons practice or intelligence collection.

[Read more…]

From a Baltic Commanders Conference to a maritime component command in 10 years

2021-04-24 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Sebastian Bruns and Julian Pawlak on CIMSEC:

As early as 2015, the Baltic Commanders Conference (BCC), a consultation format, was launched in response to altered security policy constellations and was intended to strengthen communication and cooperation between the neighboring navies – including non-Baltic state Norway, but without Russia.
The German Maritime Forces Staff (DEU MARFOR), established in 2019, bundles together the previous smaller task forces in Germany and, with German and international posts, will form the core staff of the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC), which is currently being set up. From 2025 the German Navy intends to develop key maritime skills with the BMCC and seeks to be able to take over the tactical leadership of multinational units in the Baltic, the North Sea, and the North Atlantic. For this purpose, NATO’s unique “Baltic Sea Headquarters” will be offered as a command center for national and allied defense operations on the northern flank.

Remarkable how much can change in one decade.

Why Small Navies Prefer Warfighting over Counter-Piracy

2020-11-02 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

I recently published an article in a the book Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, edited by Edward R. Lucas, Thomas Crosbie, Samuel Rivera-Paez, and Felix Jensen, ISBN 978-1-64368-088-0.

The final publication is available at IOS Press through http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/NHSDP200055. Fortunately, the publisher makes it possible for authors to publish their work on personal or institution websites, which is great because open access to research is important. Therefore, I have also published the article below to make it accessible to a broader audience, or you can download a watermarked version of the final article.

In the article, I use recent operational history of the Royal Danish Navy as a case study into the particular challenges that small navies face. Denmark provides a useful lens because the long counter-piracy mission from 2008–2015 consumed a substantial amount of the navy’s collective warfighting resources. The experience was that it was impossible to maintain a sufficient level of warfighting skills while also committing so many resources to a maritime policing operation. From the literature on small navies it is identified that they typically struggle with problems related to critical mass of materiel, maintaining a sufficient training and education system, limited bureaucratic strength, and a tendency of their leaders to be over-ambitious. It is shown that the requirement to prioritize resources has enticed the Danish Navy to find innovative solutions, but that in the process some choices may have led to an unconscious acceptance of lower standards and disregard for the complexity of less prestigious tasks.

Introduction

In this chapter I examine how small navies manage conflicting requirements when forced to prioritize between maritime security operations and high-intensity warfighting. All navies face the challenge of balancing ambitions and means, but small navies are particularly obliged to make hard choices. For them, setting priorities is often a matter of abandoning tasks altogether, whereas larger navies have more resources to shuffle around.

I use a case study of Denmark as a prism into the problem. Denmark provides a good example because the country has combined a lean military structure with an impressive willingness to commit naval forces abroad. This means that the Royal Danish Navy (RDN) has had to display flexibility to make ends meet. Between 2008 and 2015, the counter-piracy mission around the Horn of Africa absorbed most of the resources for the country’s larger warships. Then, in 2015, a dramatic shift in focus occurred, as the Navy removed its ships from the counter-piracy effort and instead focused on regaining lost abilities in high-intensity warfighting. The consensus was that the counter-piracy effort had influenced negatively on the performance of the warships in traditional naval disciplines, and that it was time to “get back to basics.”

The Danish example is profound, but it is also characteristic. All small navies face similar dilemmas of balancing tasks and resources. It is also common to experience that a long counter-piracy mission makes it hard for a crew to remain sharp at high-intensity warfighting. But the Danish case is particularly useful, because Denmark committed so wholeheartedly to the operation against Somali piracy for six years and then quit abruptly.
First, I lay out the theory about small navies. I elaborate on the theoretical aspects, as the goal of the chapter is to say something general about small navies and not particularly about Denmark. I examine different standards by which navies can be categorized, and I show why it is reasonable to say that Denmark has a small navy. This may seem like a commonsense argument, but indeed by some of the popular categorization models the RDN is not small. Then I move on to describing the particular challenges that small navies face. I particularly draw on Geoffrey Till’s (2003, 2014, 2016) writing to derive a model that can function as a framework for analysis. This model identifies critical mass, training and education, and political influence as the three areas that particularly cause problems for small navies. I also expand on a point by Basil Germond (2016) to show that small navies gravitate toward overstretch in order to overcome the inherent unpleasantness of “smallness.”

Then I move on to describing the history of the Danish engagement in the counter-piracy mission off Somalia. I show that it was a hard mission, and that it took time before the RDN and the bureaucracy at home mastered the challenges. I also describe the costs that counter-piracy had for the Navy in regard to retention problems and training standards. To solve these problems, the RDN contracted with training institutions in the United Kingdom and Germany to bring the ships back up to standards. To this day, this training and certification effort remains the most pronounced commitment for the Danish warships.

In the last section of the chapter, I analyze the Danish counter-piracy endeavor from a perspective of small navy theory. I identify patterns and problems related to critical mass, training and education, and political influence, and I point to instances where the desire to overcome smallness has led the RDN to make compromises. I apply the theory with a critical approach to investigate assumptions and explanations. In all areas this leads to distinctive explanations and warnings about possible pitfalls, and especially within the category of training and education the critical approach indicates some areas where unconscious assumptions may have led the RDN to make choices that probably aren’t helpful in the long run. This contributes with particular (and hopefully useful) knowledge about the RDN, but it also provides an example of how small navy mechanisms play out more generally, and how such an analysis could be performed with a different case study in mind.

Theory about small navies

The first problem in a theoretical discussion about small navies is how to define them. Several classification systems have been developed to group navies into conceptual categories. One of the more popular models was created by the naval historian Eric Grove in 1990. The system was mainly based on quantitative data about a navy’s capabilities, and its nine categories were defined by the ability to project power abroad (Germond, 2016, pp. 35–36). Grove later revised his system and optimistically included Denmark as a rank three navy because of the improvements in force structure (Grove, 2016, p. 18). This places Denmark as a “Medium Regional Force Projection Navy.” Grove notes that small navies are from level four and smaller, so by this standard, the RDN is not a small navy.

Russia signs contract for new versatile helicopter carriers

2020-06-08 By Anders Puck Nielsen 1 Comment

A few weeks ago, TASS announced that Russia has signed a contract for two project 23900 large universal landing ships. These are very large ships able to carry up to 20 heavy helicopters, small boats, and up to 900 naval infantry soldiers.

This is not particularly surprising, but it is still an interesting confirmation that Russia is on track with this project. Last fall, it was confirmed that Russia was close to beginning the actual construction of such ships, and in January we even learned the names of the two helicopter carriers: They will be called Sevastopol and Vladivostok. (Update: Turns out they will actually be called Ivan Rogov and Mitrofan Moskalenko.) These are the same names that were intended for the two Mistral-class ships that were canceled by France after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is thus somewhat ironic that the two new ships will be built at the Zaliv shipyard in Crimea.

In a piece for Forbes, David Axe notes that the sketches of the Russian ships look very similar to the Mistral-class, and he goes so far as to hint that Russia more or less blatantly has copied the design. He also notes that “just because Russia plans to copy the Mistral design doesn’t mean it will succeed in doing so. The Russian shipbuilding industry in recent years has struggled to build any vessel larger than a frigate.” This article caused some indignation in Russia, and Gazeta.ru found the need for a rebuttal. They mobilized professor Boris Usvyatsov to explain why Russia absolutely hasn’t stolen design clues from the French. The rebuttal seems weak, though. Usvyatsov explains that there is a fundamental difference in philosophy between Russia and the West in the design of amphibious ships, and therefore it is certain that Russia has nothing to gain from copying. In the West, amphibious operations are mostly conducted with helicopters, whereas the Russian approach is to roll amphibious armored vehicles off the ship through a bow visor. He also explains that maritime operations are conducted differently in Russia and the West, and for that reason Russia has no benefit from the command facilities that the Mistral-class offers.

One has to wonder whether Usvyatstov has even seen the sketches of the new ships. He claims so, but it is hard to follow his logic while comparing to the pictures. It unmistakably looks like a Mistral-class, and it obviously is designed primarily for helicopter operations. But his comments do emphasize one important thing about this class of ships: They are not primarily meant for amphibious assaults. This is also why I object to the classical Western classification of them as amphibious assault ships or amphibious assault carriers. Sure, that is one thing they can do, but they are an extremely versatile maritime platform that is optimized for pretty much any kind of interaction with land, and they benefit from a large size and endurance. They are useful for amphibious assaults, but they are also perfect for tasks like disaster relief, logistical support, special operations, and operational command. Therefore, I find the Russian classification as “universal landing ships” more accurate than the Western “amphibious assault ships”. It is ironic that the Russian professor is the one to focus narrowly on amphibious assaults.

These ships are the future of Russia’s maritime global power projection capability. Forget the Shtorm-class aircraft carriers or the Lider-class cruisers. Russia can’t afford them, and frankly their money is better spent on more frigates and destroyers. But the universal landing ships provide unique capabilities that cannot be compensated for with smaller platforms or longer range aviation. They are the multi-tool of giant warships, and they will give Russia the ability to project power onto shores in a variety of different ways in almost any scenario. Just imagine the forceful message it would send if Russia had such a ship lingering off Tripoli these days.

Joint Iran-China-Russia exercise is impressive display of naval diplomacy

2019-12-28 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Russia, China, and Iran are conducting a maritime exercise in the Gulf of Oman, and it is attracting world headlines. Many commentators frame it as a bold answer to the United States and the coalition that is engaged in a maritime security operation in the Strait of Hormuz. But it is easy to exaggerate the scale and significance of this joint exercise.

First, Russia and China essentially sent one warship each. China participates with the Luyang III-class destroyer Xining, and Russia has joined with the frigate Yaroslav Mudry from the Baltic Fleet. In many places it is reported that Russia has sent three ships, but the other two are the tanker Yelna and the tugboat Viktor Konetskiy.¹ The three Russian ships departed from Baltiysk on October 1st, and they have since participated (at least symbolically) in the counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, and they took part in the Indra 2019 exercise with the Indian Navy earlier in December.

So this exercise with Iran is quite small, and it is largely symbolic. It does not display a significant ability of Russia to act as a naval power in the Middle East. China has more such power, but it seems unlikely that they would use it for anything that could damage the free flow of trade through the Strait of Hormuz. China’s economy would suffer from interruptions to the merchant traffic, so it is far from obvious that they could find common grounds with Iran if things were to escalate. So while the exercise does display unity and opposition to America, there is little reason to believe that it will materialize into more than a symbolic gesture.

But the Iranian-Russian-Chinese exercise does demonstrate one thing: the power of naval diplomacy. Russia and China have successfully established an impression of themselves as great powers with a stake in an unfolding conflict, and Iran has managed to display to the World that they still have powerful friends. That is quite an accomplishment, given that Russia and China basically just sent one warship each for a four-day exercise.

It is ironic that Russia feels the need to accompany any warship with a tug whenever it goes on a long journey. It really does not send a signal of self-confidence. ↩

Russia’s A2/AD strategy is a myth

2019-09-09 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

This post contains a paper I wrote for the MAST Northern Coasts 2019 conference in Copenhagen on 4-6 September 2019. It is a stark criticism of the idea of A2/AD and in particular the almost hysterical application of threat rings that is common in Western defense discussions.

Abstract

The paper examines Russia’s sea denial capabilities in the Baltic region. It is often described as if Russia has the ability to close the Baltic Sea for Western navies. This is a vulnerability for NATO because it could be impossible to reinforce the Baltic States in case of a war. However, recent research indicates that the effectiveness of Russia’s so-called A2/AD capabilities is overrated. There are significant weaknesses in Russia’s surveillance and missile technology, and NATO can explore these opportunities.

This paper expands on that argument. It is shown that Russia would face both technical and political obstacles to the establishment of effective sea denial in the Baltic Sea. The technical argument is that Russia does not have the necessary naval or air assets to deny the access of Western navies to the Baltic Sea for very long. The political argument is that it is unsustainable for Russia to block all maritime traffic in the Eastern Baltic, because such a move would be counterproductive and make it less likely that Russia could achieve their political goals.

A short discussion suggests that A2/AD should rather be understood within the framework of layered defense systems. This focus rejects the notion of impenetrable bubbles, and consequently it discredits the idea that Russia intends to use A2/AD as a tool to secure offensive victories.

Introduction

The military concepts of Anti-Access and Area Denial have received much attention in the last decades. While there technically is a distinction between the two concepts, they more or less cover the same thing and are usually merged in the common abbreviation “A2/AD”.

The central notion is that modern missiles and surveillance technology make it possible to turn large areas into impenetrable fortresses.¹ The cornerstone in such an A2/AD system is typically long-range ground-launched missiles, and if an adversary’s ship or aircraft shows up, it can easily be defeated at great distances. Obviously, the adversary may also have long-range missiles, but the defending party has a tremendous advantage: Easy target acquisition. One side is forced to operate ships or aircraft in an open environment, whereas the other can base his missiles on trucks that can move around and hide in the terrain.

Russia’s ability to establish effective A2/AD has been widely discussed. Often, the metaphor of bubbles is applied, and they translate into illustrative threat rings on a map.² This can provide some frightening graphics, because commonly the sizes of the bubbles are depicted as the maximum range of the longest shooting missile. For air defense missiles the number 400 kilometers is often used because it is the theoretical maximum range of the longest shooting missile that the S-400 missile system can operate. For anti-ship missiles the range is often mentioned to be around 300 kilometers because that is the possible range of an Oniks missile fired from a Bastion coastal defense system.³ This can give the impression that Russia can effectively deny access for any ship or aircraft within hundreds of kilometers from the location of these missiles.⁴

A2/AD threat rings — Some threat rings on a map. I even put a missile battery in Estonia.

The flaws in this approach are significant. First, the operational range of a missile is substantially smaller than its maximum range. This comes from the fact that the missile never actually flies in a straight line but needs to adjust its movements to hit the target. Also, the missile almost always follows a sub-optimal flight trajectory because that allows it to be resilient against countermeasures. Second, the threat rings only represent the weapon range and don’t take the difficulty of target identification and acquisition into account. The hard part is not so much to shoot, but to know what to shoot at. This requires sensors and communication systems that possess much less impressive characteristics than the traditional notion of an A2/AD bubble would imply.

A recent report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency has shown that Russia is far from able to close the Baltic Sea in case of an armed conflict. In fact, the study finds that the effective range of the S-400 air defense system may be as little as 20-35 kilometers against a low-flying opponent.⁵ If the threat rings are drawn with such modest ranges in mind, the map of Russian A2/AD bubbles in the Baltic Region looks much less impressive.

Technical limitations to Russia’s sea denial capabilities in the Baltic

Sea denial can be understood as a subcategory of A2/AD. It means that you prohibit an opponent from using the sea to achieve his goals. For simplicity’s sake I will here limit that discussion to a question of excluding NATO from operating in the Eastern Baltic Sea with surface ships. Expanding on the argument that the hard part of A2/AD is to maintain situational awareness in the area that you are trying to control, I will examine Russia’s abilities to establish sea denial in the Baltic Sea.

In this section I look at the technical side of the matter. It is a very brief overview, and the essential point is that Russia does not have the sufficient capabilities to establish sea denial for a prolonged period of time. In the next section I complicate matters further by adding a political layer of considerations.

Land-based radars

The most obvious tool for Russia to monitor ships on the Baltic Sea may appear to be land-based radars. After all, Kaliningrad is situated in a forward position, so one could get the idea that there would be good coverage over most of the central Baltic from the enclave. That is not the case. The curvature of the earth means that ships must be really close to shore in order to be spotted on a land-based radar. Even if the radar is placed 100 meters above sea level, it will still only spot a large warship like a frigate on distances of about 60 kilometers (35 nautical miles). This is nowhere near enough to create a sufficient picture of the maritime space. Furthermore, such a land-based radar is an easy target for an anti-radiation missile, so there is little reason to believe that it would exist for very long.

Submarines

Another option is to use submarines for target identification and dissemination. The Baltic Sea provides good conditions for coastal submarines because different bodies of water meet to create a complex operating environment with intermingling hydroacoustic layers of temperature and salinity. It is therefore easy for a submarine to hide in the Baltic Sea. The trouble is that submarines are not particularly good at monitoring surface traffic. They cannot operate radar, and their visual range is limited by a very low eye height. With passive sonar they can detect surface ships at greater distance, but that is a technology with varying reliability. Furthermore, the submarine is vulnerable to anti-submarine measures, so it can be difficult to get close enough to the surface ships. Finally, it is really hard to communicate between the submarine and shore. If they transmit anything on traditional radiocommunications, they give away their position and warn the potential target. Satellite communications give some protection against detection, but it still leaves the submarine in a vulnerable position while reporting on the target.

In other words, a submarine is not a good tool for coordinating attacks with land-based missile batteries. It can – of course – use its own weapons to engage a target, but that does not solve the problem of how to provide target data for the land-based missiles. Furthermore, Russia currently only has one operational submarine in the Baltic Fleet.⁶

Surface ships

Surface ships are valuable in maritime surveillance because they can provide close-up verification of a target’s identity, but they are not particularly good at monitoring large spaces of water. Because of the curvature of the earth, a surface search radar on a frigate only covers about 40-50 kilometers. In order to benefit from the long range of the coastal missile batteries, Russia would have to station the surface scouts in a forward position where they would be extremely vulnerable.

Airborne platforms

Aircraft are good surveillance platforms. Their speed makes them flexible, and the high altitude means that they achieve a good range. For the sake of simplicity, I will only cover two types of aircraft here, namely dedicated AWACS aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control System) and unmanned surveillance drones.

Russia is in the process of developing a new AWACS aircraft by the designation of Beriev A-100. It will supposedly be operational next year, and it will replace the aging Beriev A-50. Both of these aircraft are able to spot large surface warships at large distances. According to Jane’s, they can see a warship with a radar cross section of 250 m2 at distances until the horizon.⁷ That is a quite esoteric figure to work with, because the radar cross section depends on the angle of observation of the warship, and modern warships employ stealth technology to reduce their radar signature. But if we assume perfect conditions and an aircraft altitude of 10,000 meters, that gives a radar detection range of about 400 kilometers (220 nautical miles). This is theoretically a good coverage, and the aircraft can transmit target data to the ground-based missile launchers. The problem is that contact detection does not equate target identification. In practical terms you cannot shoot if all you have is a bleep on a radar screen. You need the contact to meet certain identification criteria before you decide that it is a valid target, and in most cases that requires closer inspection. This will bring the aircraft into danger from long-range surface-to-air missiles like SM-2 or SM-6. The role of the AWACS must therefore be a retracted one where they direct other assets to inspect contacts of interest. They cannot do it alone.

Another option is to use unmanned aerial drones for surveillance. Russia clearly sees a great potential in this technology, putting many resources into research and development. Small systems like Orlan-10 and Forpost have been operational for some years, and the larger Orion drone is scheduled to enter service later in 2019.⁸ Drones enjoy long endurance, and they have the advantage that one can take risks with them without jeopardizing the safety of a crew. However, drones are also vulnerable to air-defense weapons. Both Orlan-10 and Forpost drones have been shot down in Ukraine, and it is safe to assume that NATO would be very efficient in picking these airplanes out of the sky. It is therefore unlikely that Russia could use them to solve the problem of target acquisition in an A2/AD system for very long.

Satellite based surveillance

Satellite based surveillance is no panacea to Russia’s challenges of maritime surveillance in an A2/AD scenario. The technology is still immature, and NATO has reliable anti-satellite weapons. There is therefore no reason to believe that Russia can rely on satellite surveillance to provide target data for their coastal missile batteries.

Political limitations to Russia’s sea denial capabilities in the Baltic

Until now I have argued from a technical perspective that it would be difficult for Russia to establish effective sea denial in the Baltic Sea. The range of their missiles is smaller than often assumed, and more importantly they lack surveillance capabilities to conduct effective target acquisition in the maritime domain for a prolonged period of time.

In this section I will complicate matters further. When threat rings on a map are used to illustrate A2/AD bubbles, it is often assumed that these bubbles will be more or less empty. To the extent that there is traffic, it will be friendly units because everyone else must stay out in order to avoid destruction. Therefore, the process of target identification is quite simple, because any unidentified echo on the radar screen must be the enemy. But this is a flawed assumption.

The issue is that war does not happen in a political vacuum. Clausewitz’ theorem that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”⁹ will also apply to the scenario of Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea. There will be a reason why we ended up in this situation, and there will be a desire to achieve something.

Typically, the assumed scenario is a Russian invasion of the Baltic States.¹⁰ The A2/AD bubble is then intended to play the role of presenting NATO with a fait accompli, because the liberation of the Baltic States would be extremely difficult. Whether one uses this scenario or a less dramatic one, it is clear that Russia would not want a new baseline where they are unable to use the Baltic Sea for trade or fishing. The point of sea denial is to prevent your opponent from using the sea, not to prevent oneself from doing it.

I will briefly point to three political factors that illustrate why Russia cannot keep a clean operating environment in the Baltic Sea for very long. Instead, they would be forced to open up for merchant ships and fishing vessels really quickly, which would make the task of sea denial for NATO’s military forces almost insurmountable.

First, Russia gains tremendously from the internationally regulated system of maritime trade. In 2018, the Russian ports in the Baltic Sea handled more than 246 million tons of cargo, including over 133 million tons of oil products.¹¹ Russia would like this activity to continue, also after a limited military confrontation with NATO. The best-case scenario for Russia would be that everyone accepted “the new normal” as quickly as possible so trade relations could be resumed. It would be essential for Russia that all ports – both their own and the ones in the Baltic States – continue to thrive and contribute to the economy.

Second, Russia’s military goals in the Baltic Region would be limited. In case of an attack on the Baltic States, Russia would face the question of what to do about the other countries in the region. Russia would have an interest in disturbing countries like Finland, Sweden, Poland, and Germany as little as possible, because they may then be more prone to accepting the new geopolitical realities in the region. It would thus be desirable for Russia not to interrupt the merchant traffic to Finland and Sweden, and ferry connections may still operate across the Baltic Sea.

Third, in a well-regulated maritime space, warships also enjoy the freedom of navigation afforded to other ships. If Russia wants to advance the idea that other countries should accept an annexation as a new normal, they would also have to allow these countries to move warships around in a somewhat normal fashion. This can be seen in connection with Russia’s own dependence on the ability to move warships in and out of the Baltic Sea, where they are vulnerable to a naval blockade in the Danish straits. The point is that it would be impossible for Russia to achieve their political goals if they attacked every warship that showed up. At the very minimum they would have to accept that the neutral countries Sweden and Finland could patrol their own waters, and in the longer run it would also be untenable to keep NATO’s warships out.

These three factors all suggest that the operational environment in the Baltic Sea would be complicated for Russia. They would not have neat and empty A2/AD bubbles to deal with, but rather a crowded space of intermingling fishing vessels, merchant ships, and foreign warships. This is the operating environment in which Russia would have to decide which contacts to target with their long-range missiles.

What is A2/AD actually for?

Until now, I have made two basic arguments. From a technical perspective I have made the case that Russia is unable to establish A2/AD bubbles in the fashion that is often depicted in Western analyses. They have some long-ranging missiles, but the surveillance technology is insufficient, so they would be unable to do proper target acquisitioning over a prolonged period of time. From a political perspective I have argued that Russia is unlikely to even try to establish A2/AD in the wake of a military land grab in the Baltic Region. The reason is that such persistent aggressive behavior would make it impossible to for other countries in the region to accept Russia’s claim of a “new normal”.

S-400 Triumph air defense missile system.
Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense

For Russia, this is obviously not news. They are keenly aware of their own technical limitations and political restraints. Nobody in Russia argues that they could get away with military aggression by asserting an A2/AD bubble afterwards. However, that does not mean that A2/AD is an irrelevant topic. Rather, A2/AD plays a central role in Russia’s military strategy, only not in the way that many military analysts in the West assume. In this final section I will discuss what the purpose of A2/AD is from a Russian perspective.

The first thing to notice is that Russia undoubtably enjoys the fact that the West is afraid of their missiles. They rarely miss an opportunity to praise their own technology, and they routinely nurture a narrative of stellar missile performance. This serves the important purpose of giving an impression of ability. As Robert Jervis noted, deterrence is ultimately a question of perception.¹² It doesn’t necessarily have much to do with objective reality or the perceptions of others. Russia acknowledges the subjective nature of deterrence, and they have noticed that their long-range missiles provoke a forceful response in the West.

Therefore, Russia maintains the impression that they could potentially establish effective area denial in the Baltic Sea. This is a convenient narrative, because it shifts the power dynamics in the region. Objectively, one might look at a map of the Baltic Sea and notice that NATO controls most of the territory, but by fueling the A2/AD storyline, Russia has effectively shifted the discussion. If the Western powers believe that they only control the Baltic Sea because Russia allows them to do so, then Russia has gained a tremendous advantage.

The other thing to consider is that Russia doesn’t primarily see a scenario where they are the aggressive belligerent. In fact, arguably they don’t see this scenario at all. Instead, they largely assume that the purpose of their armed forces is to deter the West – and most notably the United States – from attacking them. This might seem like a paranoid thought from a Western perspective, but it nevertheless is the premise of the security dilemma that opposite sides perceive the actions of the opponent with concern.¹³

What this means is that A2/AD can be understood as a tactic that is meant for a rather extreme defense of the homeland. It is not designed as a flexible tool to be applied while one’s country is winning, but as a bulwark against defeat.¹⁴ This is a radically different way to understand A2/AD because it changes the time perspective. From being an impenetrable bubble that can be maintained for a long time, A2/AD becomes a part of a layered defense system. In this scenario, Russia does not envision itself as limited by political considerations, because they will be under attack and justified in taking extreme measures. They also will not be limited by the technological shortcomings of their surveillance systems, because they won’t have to do it for very long. Therefore, they can throw all resources into the task at once.

Conclusion

The argument in this paper is that the West typically misunderstands Russia’s ability to establish A2/AD in the Baltic Sea. The notion that maximum missile ranges can be transformed into threat rings on a map is fundamentally flawed. I have used a case study of sea denial in the Eastern Baltic Sea to illustrate the problems with this traditional understanding of A2/AD.

From a technical point of view the idea of impenetrable bubbles overlooks the facts that a) the effective range of missiles is much smaller than the maximum range, and b) the hard part about sea denial is target identification and not to shoot the actual missile. In a war situation, Russia simply does not have the required capabilities to conduct sea denial against NATO for a prolonged period of time.

From a political perspective the traditional idea of A2/AD bubbles is even less credible. In Western debates it is always assumed that the military conflict will be initiated by Russia, and that it involves some kind of territorial occupation. The A2/AD bubble is then imagined as a tool to present NATO with a fait accompli, because any attempt to liberate the lost territories would be a bloodbath. The problem here is that effective sea denial would work contrary to any political goals that Russia could be assumed to have. There is no scenario in which Russia wants to destroy its own maritime economy. Instead, Russia will want its neighboring countries to accept the geopolitical situation as a “new normal”. This will require a quick reestablishment of the internationally regulated system of maritime communications, including the rights of other countries to operate warships in the Baltic. A prolonged period of aggressive A2/AD will almost certainly unite Russia’s neighbors against any notion that the situation is normal.

The proper way to understand the illustrative maps with threat rings is not as A2/AD bubbles, but as outer limits of a layered defense. Nobody expects such a limit to be impenetrable, because the enemy has very few effective weapons at this range. This more sober framework leads to a different interpretation of the meaning of Russia’s long-range missiles. First, Russia’s supposed A2/AD weapons are mostly intended to contribute to a layered defense in case of a Western attack on Russia. They are not omnipotent game changers, and they definitely will not on their own force the West to accept a fait accompli in case of Russian aggression against the Baltic States. And second, Western leaders should not let themselves be guided by a contorted perception of Russian weapon effectiveness. There are definitely reasons to be concerned about Russia and the future stability of the Baltic Region, but A2/AD bubbles are not one of them.

Luis Simon, “Demystifying the A2/AD Buzz,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/demystifying-the-a2ad-buzz/. ↩
Ian Williams, “The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 3, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/. ↩
Sergey Sukhankin, “David vs. Goliath: Kaliningrad Oblast as Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubble,’” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2, no. 1 (August 21, 2019): 102, https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.20. ↩
Constance Douris, “Lexington Institute,” Lexington Institute (blog), September 19, 2016, https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/natos-urgent-effort-deter-russian-aggression/. ↩
Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble. Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications” (FOI, March 2019), 29, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R–4651–SE. ↩
Anders Puck Nielsen, “Russia Reinforces Baltic Fleet with Submarine ‘Alrosa,’” Romeo Squared (blog), August 31, 2018, https://romeosquared.eu/2018/08/31/submarine-alrosa-reinforces-russian-baltic-fleet/. ↩
Jane’s, “Beriev A-50 and A-100 Series,” January 31, 2019, https://janes-ihs-com.ezproxy.fak.dk/Janes/Display/jaem0004-jc4ia. ↩
TASS, “Russian Defense Firm to Deliver 1st Orion Reconnaissance Drone to Troops by Year-End,” TASS, August 29, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1075649. ↩
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989). ↩
Anders Puck Nielsen, “How Would a War between Russia and the West Play Out?,” Romeo Squared (blog), January 1, 2018, https://romeosquared.eu/2018/01/01/the-military-scenario/; Rowan Allport, “Fire and Ice – A New Maritime Strategy for NATO’s Northern Flank” (London, UK: Human Security Centre, 2018), 45–51, http://www.hscentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Fire-and-Ice-A-New-Maritime-Strategy-for-NATOs-Northern-Flank.pdf. ↩
Administratsiya Morskikh Portov Baltiyskogo Morya, “Arkhiv Dannykh Po Gruzooborotu,” accessed August 31, 2019, https://www.pasp.ru/arhiv. ↩
Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security 7, no. 3 (1982): 3–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538549. ↩
Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171–201. ↩
Anders Puck Nielsen, “Militarization in the Baltic and the Arctic Compared: The Arctic Is the Dangerous Place,” Romeo Squared (blog), May 24, 2019, https://romeosquared.eu/2019/05/24/comparing-the-baltic-and-the-arctic-the-arctic-is-the-dangerous-place/. ↩

Which ships will be at Naval Day parade in Saint Petersburg on 28 July 2019?

2019-07-17 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

There finally seems to be a somewhat reliable list of participating ships in Russia’s Naval Day parade on 28 July in Saint Petersburg. It has been an unusually quiet process this year. Last year we had a fairly good idea about the participants already in April, and the final list was announced in early July.

This year there has been much less information about the event. In January, the Navy announced that the parade will be one of the most beautiful cultural events for Saint Petersburg in 2019, and they hinted they might increase the number of ships compared to last year. Then in June they announced that the OPV Vasiliy Bykov had left the Black Sea to participate in the parade. It also came out that the new frigate Admiral Kasatonov will take part, although it hasn’t been commissioned yet. Admiral Kasatonov is the second ship of the Admiral Gorshkov class.

Putin on Naval Day 2017 — Vladimir Putin at the Grand Naval Parade in Saint Petersburg in 2017. Photo: Kremlin.ru.

The next piece of news came from an unusual angle, namely the Danish Defense. The Slava class cruiser Marshall Ustinov, the Udaloy class destroyer Severomorsk, the tug SB-406, and the Oscar II class nuclear submarine Smolensk had passed the Danish straits. The Russian Ministry of Defense later confirmed that the ships will take part in the parade.

Now news have come that the Russian Navy will perform a practice run of the parade on 21 July. In this connection, it was also mentioned that the frigate Admiral Gorshkov will participate, along with the Steregushchiy-class corvette Stoikiy, the new Alexandrit-class minesweeper Ivan Antonov, the Nanuchka-class corvette Livien, and some small Grachonok-class boats. Another practice round already took place, and here was also participation of the Ropucha-class landing ship Minsk, the corvette Steregushchiy, and the Kilo-class submarine Vladikavkaz. If we add all these ships together, it seems likely that we have a comprehensive list of the participating ships in the parade. In addition to the Russian ships, there will also be participating units from China, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

The big news in this announcement clearly is the participation of Admiral Gorshkov, which is completing a longer voyage around the world. I have earlier speculated on Twitter that Admiral Gorshkov may be headed for the parade in Saint Petersburg, and it turned out to be true. It just made a lot of sense. The list of ships is impressive but frankly a bit boring. It is largely a repetition of the same ships as last year, so it would be nice for the Russian Navy to have a spectacular story to tell. The world trip of Admiral Gorshkov fits that bill.

This may also explain why the list of participating ships has not been published earlier: They didn’t want to reveal the participation of Admiral Gorshkov. First, the ship could have been delayed somewhere along the journey, and that would have turned the whole thing into a negative story about missed participation instead. And second, they probably didn’t want to spoil the force projection effect of sailing around in the Caribbean with a modern frigate. The American counterparts made a big deal out of the ship. Some of the official reactions were over dramatic, and in the news it was speculated that the Russian warship could have something to do with the situation in Venezuela. This was great branding value, and it would have been lost if it had had been known that Admiral Gorshkov was simply passing by on its way home. So from that perspective, it made sense not to publish a list of participants in the Naval Day Parade before Admiral Gorshkov was close to the Baltic Sea.

Overall, 43 ships and smaller vessels will take part in the parade along with 41 aircraft of different types and more than 4000 troops. That is roughly the same numbers of ships as last year, but a larger number of airplanes.

Russian battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov delayed from maintenance until 2023

2019-07-02 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The refit of the Russian battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov will take a few years longer than planned. According to Flotprom.ru, that was announced this week by Alexey Rakhmanov who is president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) during the ARMY 2019 International Military-Technical Forum.

Admiral Nakhimov is a Kirov-class battlecruiser. It was originally commissioned in 1988. A contract for modernization was signed in 2013, and in 2014 the ship was handed over to the shipyard. The first plan was to have the ship ready for service again in 2020, but that was later changed to 2021. As late as this January, the message was that Admiral Nakhimov would be ready for sea trials in 2020. However, now this schedule has been moved to the right by a few years. According to OSK, the ship will not be ready for service before late 2022 or early 2023. The shipyard prepares to launch the ship into water in 2021 because they need the dry dock for other purposes, but they will need another year and a half to finish the works.

The Kirov-class is an enormous warship. It is 250 meters long and displaces an impressive 25,860 tons. It is powered by two nuclear reactors that deliver a total of 163,000 hp. This gives the ship a speed up to 31 knots. The Russian name for the class is project 1144, Orlan.

Four Kirov-class ships were constructed between 1973 and 1996. Admiral Ushakov (originally Kirov) and Admiral Lazarev (originally Frunze) have both been idle since 2002, and an official decision has been made to scrap them both in 2021.

The only remaining Kirov-class aside from Admiral Nakhimov is the 10 years younger Pyotr Velikiy. It is still in active service but a large maintenance and upgrade program is scheduled to begin in 2020. So if they begin the refit of Pyotr Velikiy on time, Russia will have to face a period without any battlecruisers on active duty.

Russia orders two more frigates and large landing ships

2019-04-11 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Defense minister Sergey Shoigu has announced that Russia will start construction of four new large warships later this month. This includes two Gorshkov-class frigates and two Ivan Gren class landing ships. Keel laying of all four ships will apparently happen simultaneously on 23 April. That writes flotprom.ru

The two Gorshkov-class frigates will be built at the Severnaya Verf in Saint Petersburg. It is not a huge surprise that Russia has decided to order two more of these ships. Rumors have circulated about it for a while, and the holdup appears to have been caused by insecurity about the funding. With these new ships, the total number of Gorshkov-class frigates will increase to six. The first of class, Admiral Gorshkov, was delivered last summer, and the second ship, Admiral Kasatonov, is expected this year. The third ship, Admiral Golovko, and fourth ship, Admiral Isakov, are expected by 2022. Rumors say that the fifth and sixth ships will be named Admiral Amelko and Admiral Chichagov.

Russia seems quite happy with their Gorshkov-class frigate design. Admiral Gorshkov is currently on its first long journey. It left Sri Lanka a few days ago and is now headed for Qingdao where it will participate in a naval parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Navy. They still improve the design, and the new ships will have 24 cells for Kalibr or Oniks missiles instead of 16. Russia is also working on a design for a larger version of the ship, nicknamed the Super-Gorshkov.

The two new Ivan Gren class landing ships will be built at Yantar in Kaliningrad. This was a bigger surprise for me. Rumors have circulated for a while about a new order of these ships, but I have mostly seen it as an expression of wishful thinking from the shipbuilding industry. Before the delivery of Ivan Gren last year, the message was that the Defense Ministry had decided not to purchase more of these ships than the two already in construction.

Ivan Gren was delivered to the Russian Navy last year after a construction process that was marked by endless trouble and delays. It took 14 years to finish Ivan Gren, which is a really long time for a ship that doesn’t introduce groundbreaking new technology. The second ship in the class is Petr Morgunov, and it is expected later in 2019. I would speculate that the decision to purchase another two Ivan Gren class ships is influenced by a desire to support the shipyard industry. Russia is working to diversify the production line, so that military factories also produce goods for the civilian society. However, the degree of civilian production is still low, and many production facilities can only stay in business if the government buys new military equipment. So if I were to guess about the order of priorities, it would be that the goal is to sustain the Yantar Shipyard while also getting a ship that the Navy might find useful. In the long run, the landing ships that the Russian military really wants are the Mistral-class replacements, but developing such a ship will be much more expensive than prolonging the serial production of the Ivan Gren class.

Finally, Shoigu announced that the name Merkuriy will be given to the first ship of the project 20386 class of new corvettes. This name has a historical significance, as Merkuriy was a legendary brig that performed extraordinarily well in a battle against Turkish ships in 1820. However, the Russian government’s attempts at finding a new ship for this name has turned into something of a renaming carousel. First the name was given to the second ship of the Karakurt-class. This happened shortly after the Defense Ministry had decided to change the naming convention of the Karakurt ships from “unpleasant weather phenomenons” to “small Russian cities”. In a matter of two months, this ship changed name from Taifun to Sovetsk to Merkuriy. Now they need to find a new name for it again. The project 20386 corvette now called Merkuriy used to be called Derzkiy.