Romeo Squared

Defense with a Baltic edge

China

How China modernized its fishing fleet in the South China Sea

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Ryan D. Martinson in a piece titled Xi likes big boats (coming soon to a reef near you) on War on the Rocks:

Photos the Philippine government released in March show nests of Chinese fishing vessels moored in the lagoon of the disputed reef. Aside from the sheer number of craft present, one is struck by the size of individual vessels. Satellite images reveal many boats 60 meters (almost 200 feet) in length — dwarfing the Philippine Coast Guard vessel (BRP Cabra) sent to monitor their activities.

Chinese fishers did not buy these boats out of mere love for Xi. Even if that were their motive, they could not afford these expensive craft without some help. Rather, the more than 200 fishing vessels seen congregating at Whitsun Reef are largely a product of policies that China has designed to prioritize Spratly fishing vessels in a national program to modernize the country’s fishing industry. This program has provided China’s maritime militia with potent new tools with which to exert influence and control in disputed maritime space — posing significant new challenges for Southeast Asian states.

Fascinating account of how China under Xi’s leadership around 2012 initiated a massive upgrade of its fishing fleet in the South China Sea. Small wooden boats have been replaced by massive steel-hulled ships that dwarf the coastguard vessels of neighboring states.

Obviously, these “fishing” ships are organized in China’s Maritime Militia, which arguably is a hybrid force designed to challenge the rule of international law in the South China Sea. It is worrisome that both China and Russia seem to have their crosshairs fixed on UNCLOS.

Joint Iran-China-Russia exercise is impressive display of naval diplomacy

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Russia, China, and Iran are conducting a maritime exercise in the Gulf of Oman, and it is attracting world headlines. Many commentators frame it as a bold answer to the United States and the coalition that is engaged in a maritime security operation in the Strait of Hormuz. But it is easy to exaggerate the scale and significance of this joint exercise.

First, Russia and China essentially sent one warship each. China participates with the Luyang III-class destroyer Xining, and Russia has joined with the frigate Yaroslav Mudry from the Baltic Fleet. In many places it is reported that Russia has sent three ships, but the other two are the tanker Yelna and the tugboat Viktor Konetskiy.1 The three Russian ships departed from Baltiysk on October 1st, and they have since participated (at least symbolically) in the counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, and they took part in the Indra 2019 exercise with the Indian Navy earlier in December.

So this exercise with Iran is quite small, and it is largely symbolic. It does not display a significant ability of Russia to act as a naval power in the Middle East. China has more such power, but it seems unlikely that they would use it for anything that could damage the free flow of trade through the Strait of Hormuz. China’s economy would suffer from interruptions to the merchant traffic, so it is far from obvious that they could find common grounds with Iran if things were to escalate. So while the exercise does display unity and opposition to America, there is little reason to believe that it will materialize into more than a symbolic gesture.

But the Iranian-Russian-Chinese exercise does demonstrate one thing: the power of naval diplomacy. Russia and China have successfully established an impression of themselves as great powers with a stake in an unfolding conflict, and Iran has managed to display to the World that they still have powerful friends. That is quite an accomplishment, given that Russia and China basically just sent one warship each for a four-day exercise.

  1. It is ironic that Russia feels the need to accompany any warship with a tug whenever it goes on a long journey. It really does not send a signal of self-confidence. ↩