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Defense with a Baltic edge

Nuclear weapons

Militarization in the Baltic and the Arctic compared: The Arctic is the dangerous place

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This is a summary of a presentation that I gave at a recent conference by the George C. Marshall Center and the Swedish Defence University. I was asked to give a Danish perspective on the question “Could Arctic Security Mechanisms provide an example of best practice for the Baltic Sea region?”

The question implies that the Arctic Region has better security mechanisms than the Baltic Sea Region. That seems like a questionable assumption. Here, I will argue that the Baltic Region is in fact more secure than the Arctic. I also suggest that very different dynamics determine the security environment in the two theaters, so it is hard to compare them. The Baltic is mostly a discussion about possible Russian revisionism, whereas the Arctic is about strategic nuclear deterrence.

The typical Danish view on the Russia challenge

But first, I will address the matter of a Danish perspective on the relationship between the Arctic and the Baltic. The typical Danish view on the Russian challenge is that the West faces Russia in three different theaters. In the South there is great power Russia which engages in foreign conflicts like Syria or Venezuela. Russia has a different agenda than the West in these conflicts, so we find ourselves in active opposition to one another. In the East there is a revanchist Russia which seeks a sphere of influence in its near abroad. This Russia needs to be deterred from military adventures in Eastern Europe. And in the North there is a friendly Russia with whom we can cooperate through organs like the Arctic Council, and which abides by international law and norms. So the traditional Danish formulation of a Russia strategy will be something like this:

  1. Cooperate in the North
  2. Deter in the East
  3. Oppose in the South

The goal is to keep these theaters separate from each other, so things don’t get confused. The optimistic assumption is that Russia has a similar interest in a separation of issues. I will not go further into a discussion about the Southern challenge, because that is beyond the topic. But in the rest of the post, I will discuss the challenges in the East and the North, i.e. in the Baltic and the Arctic regions.

Based on this traditional Danish view, the answer to the original question is that Arctic Security Mechanisms can provide an example for the Baltic Region. After all, it is much better to cooperate than to threaten nuclear destruction. If we can convince Russia to give up their confrontational posture, the Arctic model could also work in the Baltic.

But this view on the Russia challenge is wrong. The reality is that security is much more stable in the Baltic Region than in the Arctic. Conveniently, the Marshall Center has published three highly relevant papers on this topic in the last few months. Dmitry Gorenburg has written about Russian Strategic Culture in a Baltic Crisis, Mark Galeotti about the role of the Baltic Region in Russian strategy, and Pavel Baev on Russian strategic guidelines for the Arctic. These papers serve as a good starting point for a discussion about the differences between the Baltic and the Arctic.

Russia in the Baltic Region

Gorenburg uses prospect theory to analyze the how Russia would act in case of a Baltic crisis. Prospect theory is the observation that people hate losing more than they like winning. Therefore, people are willing to take great risks to avoid a loss, whereas they are risk averse when they may gain some benefit.

In a crisis in the Baltic Region, Russia is not facing a loss situation. The Baltic states are already members of NATO and the EU, and Russia has absorbed the geopolitical impact long ago. Any military attack that Russia could initiate would be about gaining something that they don’t have already. Therefore, Russia will be in a domain of gains, and consequently they will be risk averse.

Map of Baltic Sea
Baltic Region

Gorenburg’s further argues that the potential gains for Russia are quite small. The Baltic States are relatively insignificant from a military perspective. It is possible that Russia could try to exploit some situation if it is possible to do so without taking much risk. But generally, Russia will prefer to minimize potential damage, and their leaders will go to great lengths to avoid adverse results. In practical terms, this means that Russia is unlikely to initiate a military confrontation in the Baltic Region and will act to deescalate if a conflict occurs.

Galeotti argues that the Baltic States are an instrument in Russia’s political war against the West. The Baltic States are targets of constant and multifaceted operations, but this is because Russia uses them to leverage pressure against other actors like the United States, NATO, and the EU. He sees no serious evidence of Russian territorial ambitions in the Baltic Region.

Also, Galeotti argues that Russia realizes how little public support there is in the Baltic States for a Russian intervention, even among the Russian speaking minorities. From a Russian perspective, an annexation of the Baltic States sounds like a major headache. The potential for a guerilla-style insurgency is large, and to that comes the obvious risk of war with NATO.

Together, Gorenburg and Galeotti paint a picture of a fairly stable Baltic Region with a low risk of Russian aggression. The most likely scenario is that Russia will continue to conduct different kinds of non-kinetic operations against the Baltic States in order to use them as instruments in a larger political war against the West. Neither Gorenburg nor Galeotti sees military confrontation in the Baltic Region as a plausible outcome.

Russia in the Arctic

Pavel Baev argues that Russia is in a unique position of strength in the Arctic. There are relatively few threats to their interests, and they have a large capacity for threatening the interests of NATO member states. If – for a moment – we apply the same prospect theory that Gorenburg used in the Baltic, we see that the situation is reversed: Any change in status quo puts Russia in a domain of loss, so they will be willing to take great risks.

Map of the Arctic
Political map of the Arctic. Image: U.S. State Department

In Baev’s argument, the Arctic is extremely important for Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Arguably, the most important asset for the Northern Fleet are the nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Also, the submarines of the Pacific Fleet need to transit the Northern Sea Route for maintenance in Severomorsk and Severodvinsk. In the coming years, the submarine based branch of the nuclear triad will become even more important as more of the new Borei-class submarines become operational. Russia has also increased conventional capabilities in the Arctic in recent years, but much of it is intended to protect the strategic nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear deterrence as the driver of militarization in the Arctic

In the following, I will elaborate on Baev’s point of nuclear deterrence as a major priority for Russia in the Arctic. In several ways, the situation today is different from what we saw during the Cold War. A pure numbers comparison may give the impression that military tensions are relatively low compared to earlier times, but such an approach ignore some important developments.

First, today we have arms control regimes that did not exist during the Cold War. This means that both the United States and Russia face limitations, and they mostly adhere to them. Some types of missiles are banned altogether, and the number of strategic warheads is limited. Both countries have about the maximum number of strategic warheads that is allowed in the New START treaty. The way this is achieved is partly by limiting the number of warheads in a missile, so they don’t carry a full payload. Unfortunately, the arms control treaties are under pressure. The INF-treaty is all but dead, and New START will likely expire in 2021. This means that both countries will have free hands to deploy many new missiles and warheads in the coming years. Because of the spare capacity in the strategic missiles, Russia can increase the number of deployed warheads really fast.

Another relatively new development is the American ballistic missile defense system. Because of the shape of the earth, a Russian missile will pass over the Arctic on its route to the United States. Therefore, a significant part of the American missile defense system is placed in the Arctic region, for example at the Thule Air Base in Greenland.

MiG-31
MiG-31 with a Kinzhal missile. Photo: mil.ru

A missile defense system is inherently a disruption of the nuclear deterrent of the opponent. In order to maintain mutually assured destruction, Russia finds it necessary to have military assets that can destroy the American defense systems. Here, Russia is helped by a third new development that has changed warfare since the Cold War: The proliferation of high-precision missiles. It seems logical that the Nagurskoye Air Base on the remote Franz Josef Land was expanded to support this kind of mission. It can now operate MiG-31 aircraft with the new Kinzhal missile, which is a high-precision missile with a range up to 2000 kilometers. This seems like the kind of weapon you would use to take out the Thule radar.

As a consequence, NATO has to respond to this threat from Russian conventional weapons. What I am getting at is that militarization is already happening, and it will probably continue in the coming years. It will not be in the form of many soldiers, but it will be with sophisticated weapon technology. Just earlier this week, the Danish defense minister suggested that perhaps Denmark needs to purchase an additional four F-35 fighters so we can have a permanent presence in Greenland. Until recently, such a suggestion was unthinkable.

What should we do

The underlying driver of the militarization in the Arctic is strategic nuclear deterrence: Russian determination to maintain nuclear parity with the United States and American determination to build a missile defense system. It is hard to see how any country would compromise on this issue.

There are, however, a few things that we can do to improve the situation. First, we need to save as much as possible of the arms control regime. The INF-treaty is probably dead, but New START can still be extended or renewed.

Second, we should cooperate as much as possible on common issues. Navigational safety is an obvious area, as is search and rescue. We could probably also find common grounds on some environmental issues. Such cooperation helps prevent military conflict because it strengthens the informal bonds between governments.

And third, we should prepare for a renewed anti-nuclear protest movement. This is an issue that potentially can threaten the cohesion of NATO. If an anti-nuclear movement gains traction in Europe, it is safe to assume that it will be the topic of intense Russian misinformation campaigns.

Why does Russia break the INF Treaty?

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The INF Treaty has been on the agenda in recent weeks. First the US ambassador to NATO inadvertently suggested that the United States might attack Russia preemptively for breaking the INF Treaty. That was a really stupid comment, and though she later backtracked, the damage was done. Then president Trump announced that he will withdraw the United States from the treaty, which opens the gates for a new arms race with nuclear missiles.

In the spring I did a talk at the Danish Defense Academy titled “Why does Russia break the INF Treaty?” I have long intended to turn it into a blog post, but for various reason I never got around to doing it. Now seems like the last call if I want to get this perspective out, and I really do believe that it is important.

For some time, it has only been a question of whether USA or Russia would be the one to terminate the treaty. Now it appears we know the answer. And though Russia publicly acts surprised and outraged that USA would take such a step, they probably breathe a sigh of relief when nobody is listening. This means that president Trump will take the political blame for the collapse of a treaty that is deeply problematic for Russia’s military ambitions.

Unfortunately, the blame game has stood in the way of a more fundamental discussion about the problems with the INF Treaty. Because there are deep problems, and it has become unsustainable to keep the treaty in its original form. Technically speaking I don’t know that Russia is building and deploying a missile that breaks the INF Treaty. I just have the word from the American side about it. But I would almost (and only almost) go so far as to say that Russia should break the treaty. It poses restrictions that were unforeseen when the treaty was signed, and these favor USA over Russia in areas that have nothing to do with nuclear weapons.

If we fail to see this perspective, we will make the wrong decisions as the INF Treaty breaks down. The United States appears to plan a response that emphasizes low-yield nuclear weapons, which frankly is an answer that misses the point. So it is worth the effort to reflect on why Russia would break the INF Treaty and jeopardize an arms control regime that also has many benefits for Russia.

What is the INF Treaty

The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 as a bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR. The goal was to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles, which especially posed a nuclear threat in Europe. The treaty bans all ground-launched missiles with a maximum range between 500 and 5500 kilometers. It also bans all launchers for such missiles.

The INF Treaty led to a significant reduction in the number of missiles on both sides. The United States destroyed some 800 missiles, and the USSR dismantled and destroyed about 1800 missiles.

Problems with the INF Treaty

The INF Treaty is 30 years old now, and it shows its age. In 1987, USA and USSR were the two superpowers and the only states with a substantial number of these missiles. It made sense with a bilateral agreement. That has changed. Today, countries such as North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Iran have ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. This has especially been a concern for Russia because they are within range of these missiles.

It is difficult for the Russians to understand that a country like China can build ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, but Russia cannot. In 2008, Russia and the United States suggested to include more countries in the INF Treaty, but nothing came of the suggestion.

An even bigger problem is that the INF Treaty does not distinguish between conventional and nuclear missiles. The Cold War was all about nuclear weapons, so it didn’t make much difference. But today the technological development has made conventional high-precision long-range missiles the big thing in warfare. Any serious contender for the role of world superpower needs to have these missiles in large quantities.

The INF Treaty only concerns ground-launched missiles. Air- and ship-based systems are not included. This creates an asymmetry of disadvantage between Russia and the United States. Protected by oceans, the United States has built capabilities to project power with air- and ship-based systems. Russia has a geography that suggests ground-based solutions. It is unrealistic that Russia could support a navy with sufficient capacity for these missiles. Even if they could afford the ships – which they cannot – it still wouldn’t make sense to depend on an expeditionary naval force to project power when your country is predominantly landlocked.

How does Russia break the INF Treaty?

Since 2012 the United States suspected that Russia was developing a missile in violation of the INF Treaty, and in 2014 they filed an official complaint. In November 2017 the United States confirmed that the missile is called SSC-8 in NATO and 9M729 in Russia.

Russia has indirectly acknowledged that they are working on a missile called 9M729, but the data about the missile is sparse. The name suggests the missile belongs to the Iskander family of missiles. The Iskander-K cruise missile has the designation 9M728, and it has a range of up to 500 kilometers. It is possible that Russia has developed a longer range version of this missile. That could simply be a question of adding more fuel to the tank.

Another theory is that 9M729 is a ground-based version of the sea-launched 3M14 Kalibr cruise missile, which has a range between 1500-2600 kilometers. That would basically be a matter of developing a ground-based launcher for Kalibr.

Iskander-K launcher
Iskander-K cruise missile launcher. The infamous 9M729 could well be an extended range version of this missile. Photo: mil.ru

In practical terms it doesn’t matter much whether SSC-8 is an extended range Iskander or a ground-launched Kalibr. Such missiles will have almost similar specifications. The groundbreaking feature of both Kalibr and Iskander is the ability to perform high-precision targeting. They also both have advanced counter-countermeasures, so they are able to penetrate most air defense systems. And finally they have the ability to carry different types of warhead, including nuclear. This means that we can interpret Iskander and Kalibr missiles as either conventional or nuclear missiles.

Herein lies the problem. The United States seems determined that Russia is breaking the INF Treaty in order to improve their nuclear arsenal, so they look for nuclear answers to balance that threat. It’s a kind of doomsday logic.

Russia wants a conventional missile, not a nuclear one

This dramatic interpretation does not make sense. The INF Treaty carries important benefits for Russia too, for example a barrier against a costly arms race that they cannot afford. They would not jeopardize the treaty for something that they have already, and it’s not like Russia lacks alternative ways to drop nuclear bombs over Europe. The SSC-8 adds very little in terms of nuclear power deterrence.

But what is plausible is that Russia would sacrifice the INF Treaty in exchange for a robust long-range high-precision missile capability. The war in Syria is a good case study of why Russia would want these missiles. While they have used the war to showcase the technical potential of their missiles, they have not been able to apply them in significant quantities. During the entire conflict, Russia has launched only around 166 cruise missiles from ships or aircraft. In comparison, USA fired at least 118 Tomahawk missiles during just one attack in Syria in April 2018.

To compare SSC-8 to Tomahawk makes a lot of sense. Russia wants the ability to do the same things with precision missiles as the United States can do with Tomahawk. That requires a ground-launched missile with greater range than the current Iskander. The fact that the missile can carry a nuclear warhead is a peripheral consideration. Tomahawk also used to have a nuclear variant, but it was disbanded because it was the least interesting feature of the missile.

So the most productive interpretation is that Russia is building a conventional missile with a maximum range that falls inside the definitions of the INF Treaty. It is unfortunate that the United States takes steps to cancel the whole treaty because of this instead of seeking to update the text. Russia might have accepted a compromise which gave them the ability to build conventional missiles without nuclear capabilities.

Now it seems that the arms control system is falling apart. In 2021 the New START Treaty will expire, so from that point the limitations on strategic nuclear missiles are also lifted. Let’s hope the two parties find the political will to negotiate before then.

Synthetic biology creates concerns about proliferation of biological weapons

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Al Mauroni in War on the Rocks about the advances in synthetic biology which can make it much easier to produce biological weapons:

Synthetic biology is a relatively recent technology whose future applications are being increasingly discussed within industry and academic circles. Like other technologies, it has potential dual-use (commercial and military) applications. As much as scientists and engineers are looking forward to creating new commercial processes and products with this capability, some experts are warning that synthetic biology could also lead to new military capabilities — specifically, new biological warfare agents and diseases that could be dangerous in the wrong hands. The John Hopkins Center for Health Security recently hosted a group exercise in which a bioengineered virus called “Clade X” was deliberately released by a violent extremist group, resulting in 150 million dead after 20 months. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute warns that synthetic biology could allow the development of “a super pathogen threatening the survival of large populations, and even civilization.”

There is something particularly creepy about biological weapons. The immediate impact of nuclear or chemical weapons means that you know that an attack has taken place.1 With biological weapons people just start dying for no obvious reason.

It seems possible that we’ll face serious non-proliferation issues for biological weapons as synthetic biology matures as a technology.

  1. Well, at least you’ll normally know that a nuclear or chemical attack takes place. Technically speaking the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko was a nuclear attack, and Sergey Skripal was poisoned with a chemical weapon. But in those cases the weapons weren’t used as weapons of mass destruction. ↩

Bulava missile now operational — a closer look at Russia’s new SLBM

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A few weeks ago, the Russian Ministry of Defense declared the Bulava missile fully ready for operational deployment. That reported TASS on 29 June with a reference to a source in the industry who claims that all tests are completed, and that the necessary papers are signed.

In the rush of current affairs, the story did not get much attention in the West. After all, Bulava has been deployed for some years in a state of final development, so it seems like an evolutionary step to upgrade its status to operational.

In a larger strategic perspective, however, it is a remarkable milestone. The Bulava missile was the last missing piece in the transformation to post-soviet technology for Russia’s submarine based nuclear deterrent. So I thought it would be a good occasion to take a closer look at the Bulava missile.

Introducing the Bulava missile

The RSM-56 Bulava missile is Russia’s new submarine launched ballistic missile. One Bulava missile can carry up to six independently targetable reentry vehicles, which essentially means that one missile carries six independent nuclear bombs.

It is designed to be launched from the Borei family of submarines, which is Russia’s new SSBN that will replace the Delta-III, Delta IV, and Typhoon submarines (Russian names Kalmar, Delfin, and Akula). In fact, so close is the relationship between the Borei submarine and the Bulava missile that it may be more accurate to say that the submarine is designed to fit the missile. The design of the submarine was changed multiple times as Russia experimented with different missile dimensions.

Each Borei or Borei-A submarine can carry 16 Bulava missiles. With six reentry vehicles in each missile, that gives a total of 96 nuclear warheads. Russia plans to build 14 Borei or Borei-A submarines, so in theory they could fit up to 1,344 independent nuclear warheads on these submarines. The real number will be much lower, but it is still an impressive figure.

Bulava missile launch
Test launch of Bulava missile in 2011. Photo: mil.ru.

Each warhead has a nuclear payload which equals up to 150 kilotons of TNT. That is in the lower end of strategic nuclear weapons but it is nevertheless about 7-8 times more than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. The relatively small payload was a conscious trade off by Russia in order to make the missile more resilient against missile defense systems.

The Bulava missile has a maximum range of around 10,000 kilometers. The operational range is a bit smaller, but it is more than enough. The missile itself is huge. It measures around 12 meters in length and has a diameter of two meters. The launch weight is about 37 tons, and each reentry vehicle can have a weight up to 1,150 kilograms.

Bulava was know as a scandal project

When the submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy launched a salvo of four Bulava missiles on 18 May, 2018, it marked the final test in a development process which had taken 20 years and earned a reputation as a scandalous money drain.

But as Denis Komarovsky points out in Izvestia1, it is not entirely fair that “Bulava” came to be understood as a synonym for a pretentious project which doesn’t work as planned. After all, the development began at a point in time when the Russian state lacked resources for proper financing. Developers would show up to the first live tests well aware that the equipment didn’t meet industry standards.

It also did not help the Bulava’s reputation that it was the first entirely new missile system to be developed in an era of televised mass media. The Russian military press was not kind to the aspiring missile, and every failed attempt would lead to discussions about the future of the project. Truth be told, earlier missiles had also failed many of the first tests, but it didn’t happen in front of rolling cameras.

In 2009, one of the failed tests created a somewhat funny anecdote when a Bulava missile became the source of UFO hysteria in Norway. The phenomenon became known as the Norwegian Spiral Anomaly. In fact, the third rocket stage had failed which made the Bulava spin uncontrollably.

Lobbyists and different fractions in the Russian government and military industrial complex utilized the Bulava’s problems to further their own agendas. An espionage scandal also hurt the reputation of the project. In 2012, three engineers were convicted for selling secrets about the missile to China.

In the end, though, the Bulava overcame the problems, and the performance in the tests improved. The four-missile salvo that finished the Bulava’s development program reflects not only the importance of the weapon system, but also that the government insisted on a hard final test. Although not unprecedented, four missiles is an unusually large salvo size for a final test. But the kind of reputation that the Bulava had built up required something unusual before the missile could be declared operational.

The strategic rationale for the Bulava missiles and Borei submarines

The story about the Bulava missile begins with the START II arms reduction treaty. This treaty never actually entered into force because Russia withdrew from the process as a response to the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. But in the early 1990s, everyone thought that START II would become a reality.

START II would ban multiple warheads (MIRVs) in strategic missiles, so one missile would carry only one warhead. However, there was an exception for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which could still be MIRVed. This made sense because the inclusion of SLBMs would essentially remove the entire submarine-based dimension in the nuclear triad unless the countries were to build a ridiculous number of submarines.

For Russia’s nuclear strategy, this initiated a pivot to sea. In the 1990s, the country’s nuclear deterrent was mostly based on ground-launched MIRVed missiles which would be banned under the new treaty. The most attractive technology in the future would be SLBMs because that could provide the greatest number of warheads with the smallest number of missiles.

Russia had inherited a submarine development program from the Soviet Union whereby Russia would have two sizes of SLBMs. A large missile would fit in an improved D-19UTTKh missile complex in the Typhoon submarines, and a smaller missile would go in a yet to be developed D-31 complex in the also yet to be developed Borei submarines. Both of these missiles would be substantially larger than the Bulava, but at least it shows that the Borei submarine was not initially planned to carry the ridiculously large R-39UTTKh Bark missile which would fit the D-19UTTKh launcher.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the D-31 was still just a paper project. The Bark missile, however, was further in the process, and during the 1990s a few test flights were conducted with little success. In 1995, Boris Yeltsin made the shocking announcement that Russia would only have one SLBM, and that this would be Bark. It made sense to prioritize because resources were scarce, but it basically left Russia with only one type of SLBM whose weight was almost 90 tons.

Borei class
Borei class submarine. Photo: mil.ru.

So when production of the first Borei submarine Yury Dolgorukiy began in 1996, it was redesigned with a big hump to fit the D-19 launcher and R-39 missile. But the navy’s leadership was skeptical about the size of the Bark missile. Needless to say that such a missile is really complicated to manage from a logistical perspective. The navy’s objections to the the size of the Bark missile was one of the reasons for the eventual abandonment of the project. The other was a shortage of high-quality solid rocket fuel to lift the enormous missile. Russia wanted to use domestic materials but the Russian factories had been unable to match the qualities of the factory in Ukraine which had produced the fuel during the Soviet era.

So in 1998, the decision was made to scrap the Bark development and to initiate a competition for a much smaller missile instead. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT) won the competition to build the Bulava missile.

In essence, this decision also meant that Russia would phase out the Typhoon submarines and bet on the Borei class as the future SSBN. One of the Typhoons, Dmitriy Donskoy, was refitted with a different launcher so it could function as a test platform for the Bulava missile while the Borei was built.

Bulava is built to beat a missile defense

Instead of overwhelming explosive power, the Bulava’s selling point is the ability to beat missile defense systems. This reflects a change in priorities in Russia’s nuclear strategy between the mid 1980s and the 2000s. The most important thing was not the size of the warhead but the certainty that the missile is resilient against countermeasures.

One example of this order of priorities is the Bulava’s low flight trajectory. It just doesn’t go very high. This is energetically a disadvantage — if the flight path had been higher, the missile could have carried heavier warheads. But Russia chose the benefits that a lower trajectory has against a missile defense system.

Another anti-anti ballistic missile feature is the ability to maneuver slightly in the initial phase so it is difficult to figure out the flight path. This makes it hard to engage the missile early. The Bulava then releases the reentry vehicles at an early point in the flight so instead of one object the missile defense system has to deal with six. It also releases a bunch of decoys to confuse the interceptor missiles.

These are just some of the features of the Bulava missile directed at beating a missile defense system. Undoubtably it also has some abilities that are surrounded by big secrecy.

Summary

Now Russia has both a submarine and a missile that were designed in the post-soviet era. This does not mean that the transformation is completed. They still need to produce many of the submarines and missiles. But the design is figured out.

Currently, Russia has three Borei submarines, and five of the improved Borei-A class are in production. Last year there were indications that a new Borei-B class was planned, but later Russia canceled the project and ordered another six Borei-A submarines instead. This will bring the total number of Borei or Borei-A submarines up to 14 within the next decade or so.

I would expect them to be able to produce the required number of Bulava missiles and reentry vehicles to follow the pace of submarine production. The Russian military industrial complex has been pretty good at turning missile designs into serial production, and the annual consumption of Bulava missiles will be limited to occasional tests.

So while the operational status of the Bulava missile does not mean that the transformation of Russia’s submarine-based nuclear forces is completed, it is a remarkable strategic milestone which shows the direction many years into the future.

  1. Komarovsky’s article is great. I draw heavily on it throughout this post. ↩

Nuclear Notebook publishes status on Russian nuclear forces, 2018

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Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris have published an examination of Russia’s nuclear forces in their Nuclear Notebook column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

This is a very comprehensive overview of Russia’s nuclear weapons. It includes informed estimates of the numbers of both launchers and warheads, and there are nice status updates on Russia’s different nuclear capable platforms. For example one can learn that Russia has a total of 4,350 nuclear warheads, of which 1,600 are deployed and ready for use, and 2,750 are in reserve. To this comes 2,500 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.

Russia is in the midst of a modernization program of its nuclear forces. This was well overdue, as many of their nuclear weapons were getting old and needed replacement. I think some Western observers exaggerate the significance of the modernization program. For some this has led to almost hysterical interpretations of Russia’s intentions. I think that the right way to understand Russia’s nuclear weapons program is that they want to maintain the capabilities that they already have.

Dnepr Launch vehicle
Drepr launch vehicle which carries the SS-18 *Satan* ICBM. According to Kristensen and Norris, Russia has 46 of these missiles with up to 460 warheads. Photo: ISC Kosmotras.

Russia is a nuclear great power and intends to remain as such. A conflict between nuclear powers like the United States and Russia will be fought with nuclear weapons. Assuming that a confrontation could be held at the non-nuclear level is naive.

So where some analysts interpret Russia’s nuclear posture as increasingly aggressive, I will point to two other movements that I find more accurate:

  1. Russia invests in the development of nuclear weapons that can defeat a Western missile defense. The goal is to maintain a second strike capability that Russia has had for many years, but which they fear they can lose if the missile defense technology gets good enough.
  2. Fundamentally the new technology for Russia is in the non-nuclear field. Long-range high-precision missiles give Russia more options than nuclear escalation. At the same time this raises the nuclear threshold and makes armed confrontation more likely because the (illusion of) surgically accurate control of destruction makes it easy for politicians to resort to using such weapons.

The Russian nuclear forces, 2018 review includes a summary of the different positions in the debate about Russia’s nuclear strategy. Unfortunately there is an inclination to the views in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which I think gets many things wrong about Russia. But with the two points above in mind, I think that Kristensen and Norris’ column is an outstanding reference about the state of Russia’s nuclear weapons.

Lessons from Ukraine’s decision to give up nuclear weapons

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Mariana Budjeryn and Polina Sinovets have an interesting look on Ukraine’s decision to give up their nuclear weapons in War on the Rocks.

The Soviet nuclear arsenal was distributed among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus and Kazakhstan quickly agreed to hand over their nuclear weapons to Russia, and after some hesitation Ukraine followed suit in 1994. This makes Ukraine an example of a successful nonproliferation effort, as in the end only one nuclear state emerged from the Soviet collapse.

Budjeryn and Sinovets identify three insights from Ukraine’s denuclearization that may be relevant in today’s nonproliferation debates.

  1. Don’t focus too much on supply-side drivers for nuclear acquisition: Ukraine inherited some nuclear weapons, but they were tied into the old Soviet command system, and it would take some work to develop an independent nuclear capability. Ukraine also inherited substantial know-how and the military-industrial capacity to complete such a project, but there just wasn’t the political will to choose to do so.
  2. Nuclear weapons are nice, but a good reputation is better: Ukraine aspired to become a part of the Western-led international order. If they had insisted on building a nuclear capacity, they would undoubtedly have been subject to sanctions and international isolation which would have been counterproductive to the country’s desire to become a liberal democracy. The lesson is that states not only relinquish nuclear weapons because they want to get or avoid something, but also because they want to become a certain kind of state. So if we want nonproliferation, we should not forget to encourage those voices in potential nuclear states who see the benefits of joining the international community.
  3. Not everyone thinks about nuclear weapons as a deterrent: Analysts in both America and Russia often become prisoners of the concepts and modes of thinking that are familiar to them. But traditional deterrence theory has difficulty explaining why anybody would renounce a nuclear option. For Ukraine’s leadership, the nuclear weapons were rather seen as an entitlement to a fair deal than as a deterrence. The military-industrial lobby focused on keeping the production lines busy, but it didn’t matter much whether the missiles were nuclear or conventional. And the military thinking in Ukraine did not support the idea of nuclear deterrence as a credible road ahead. Instead of focusing on nuclear weapons as a possible insurance against a conflict with Russia, the Ukrainian leadership saw nuclear weapons as inapplicable in those kinds of conflict that could arise.

Finally, Budjeryn and Sinovets conclude that future nonproliferation deals will be much more expensive than with Ukraine. For any prospective nuclear state, it is hard to look at Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas as anything but a violation of the security commitments that were pledged to Ukraine in exchange for denuclearization. So it must be expected that future deals will come at a higher cost and will require much more robust security commitments.

Fear of missile defense traces back to World War II for Russia

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Austin Long has a thorough account of the Soviet and Russian fear of Western missile defense capabilities in War on the Rocks under the title “Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons”.

He explains Putin’s revelation of new nuclear weapons in his March 1st speech as grounded in an old Russian concern with Western missile defense technology. The experience of being unable to respond to the German air campaign during World War II caused Stalin to focus intensely on the ability to retaliate in case of a nuclear attack. Already at that time there was talk about the dangers of an American missile defense which would leave Russia vulnerable to a first strike.

So when the Russian leadership is determined not to let an American missile defense threaten the retaliatory power of Russia, it is in line with a long history of military thinking.

So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition.

Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position.

Podcast recommendation: WOTR – A big debate about a little nuke

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There is a great discussion about Russia and nuclear weapons in this episode of the War on the Rocks podcast.

The panel is terrific. Olga Oliker is brilliant, Frank Miller is wrong about most things concerning Russia but argues his case very well, and Vipin Narang has deep technical insights. Ryan and Usha do a fantastic job of moderating the discussion between the guests who clearly represent very different views.

The discussion follows up on the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review which has some controversial assumptions about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and on Putin’s announcement of a new suite of nuclear weapons.

If the nuclear discussion interests you at all (and it should), this is a must-hear.

Russia’s new nuclear weapons are about missile defense

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Vladimir Putin spent a surprising amount of time in his March 1st speech talking about nuclear weapons. Pavel K. Baev has some interesting considerations in Brookings about the possible motivations for this:

Russia’s economic weakness is so profound that Russia cannot possibly engage in anything resembling a real arms race with the United States and NATO. Putin’s enthusiastic rollout of Russia’s missile program scored many good points domestically but produced a mixed impression among his key international audiences. It doesn’t take a shrewd strategic mind to conclude that Russia can only proceed with these entirely unnecessary weapon programs at the expense of addressing its more pressing economic needs and acute security challenges, including Syria. Putin’s posturing cannot meet many strict reality checks, but it is nevertheless, dangerous because it damages the norm of owning nuclear weapons responsibly.

In essence, Baev focuses on Putin’s need to legitimize the new 2027 state armament program, a desire to divert attention from recent poor performance in Syria, and a general inclination to ‘restoring greatness’.

I will add that Russia is truly concerned about the development of a ballistic missile defense in the West. It is debatable whether this concern is rational, but that has little to do with the affective reactions to it in Russia. The weapons that Putin announced are mostly intended to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent in an age of missile defense: A missile with unlimited range to circumvent missile defense stations, supersonic missiles that are impossible to intercept, and a nuclear bomb installed in a torpedo.

So even though Putin talked a lot about nuclear weapons in his speech, there is nothing new when it comes to the Russian doctrine for actually using nuclear weapons. The idea from the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that Russia develops non-strategic nuclear weapons for an escalate-to-deescalate strategy is still a fantasy. Russia’s nuclear development program is focused on strategic missiles, and in the non-strategic realm the goal is to develop more powerful conventional alternatives so they don’t have to use nuclear weapons.

Kofman’s look at Putin’s new weapon announcements (updated)

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Last week, Vladimir Putin held a speech in which he announced some spectacular new weapons including supersonic missiles and an intercontinental ballistic missile with nuclear propulsion to give it unlimited range.

Few people are as qualified to comment on the weapon announcements as Michael Kofman. He has just released part 1 in a two-part series about his reflections.

Overall, Kofman’s attitude is that Russia has the capability to develop these weapons, so Putin’s words should be taken seriously:

Mainstream media coverage, and expert opinions have been rather dismissive, and should be taken as cold comfort. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what many don’t know, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. Since the narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, it creates blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6 many thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of joke, until it showed up in the NPR as something less than funny.

In part 1 Kofman looks at:

Kinzhal: An aeroballistic version of the Iskander missile launched from the MiG-31 airplane. It has some remarkable specs. A range of up to 2000 kilometers, a speed of up to mach 10, capable of high-G maneuvers in the terminal phase, and with the option of both conventional and nuclear warheads.

R-28 Sarmat: A liquid fueled heavy intercontinental ballistic missile capable of deploying multiple warheads and penetration aids. It will replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18).

Avangard and/or 4202 hypersonic boost glide weapon: A concept involving an ICBM to boost a weapon to a very high altitude from where it glides toward its target and reaches amazing speed (like mach 20).

Kofman has saved the most spectacular of Putin’s announcements to part 2 in his series.

Update on 2018-03-08:
Part two of Kofman’s series is out. In this he looks at:

9M730: An intercontinental ballistic missile with nuclear propulsion. This gives the missile practically unlimited range, but it is also an inherently dirty design which spreads radiation during flight. Russia has launched an online contest to come up with a good name for the missile.

Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System: A nuclear powered torpedo with a nuclear warhead. This is intended as a threat toward coastal cities in the United States. It will be difficult to build countermeasures against this weapon which for obvious reasons is immune to a missile defense system. It is not a very practical weapon, however, because it will take days to reach its destination. This makes it impossible to control escalation once the weapon is launched. The weapon must be characterized as a revenge weapon which can be used when the war in general is already lost.

Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle: An underwater drone system which is an evolution of the 1R variant.

Some laser weapon: A rather mysterious laser cannon thing with an unclear purpose.