Romeo Squared

Defense with a Baltic edge

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Fear of missile defense traces back to World War II for Russia

By 1 Comment

Austin Long has a thorough account of the Soviet and Russian fear of Western missile defense capabilities in War on the Rocks under the title “Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons”.

He explains Putin’s revelation of new nuclear weapons in his March 1st speech as grounded in an old Russian concern with Western missile defense technology. The experience of being unable to respond to the German air campaign during World War II caused Stalin to focus intensely on the ability to retaliate in case of a nuclear attack. Already at that time there was talk about the dangers of an American missile defense which would leave Russia vulnerable to a first strike.

So when the Russian leadership is determined not to let an American missile defense threaten the retaliatory power of Russia, it is in line with a long history of military thinking.

So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition.

Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position.

Podcast recommendation: WOTR – A big debate about a little nuke

By Leave a Comment

There is a great discussion about Russia and nuclear weapons in this episode of the War on the Rocks podcast.

The panel is terrific. Olga Oliker is brilliant, Frank Miller is wrong about most things concerning Russia but argues his case very well, and Vipin Narang has deep technical insights. Ryan and Usha do a fantastic job of moderating the discussion between the guests who clearly represent very different views.

The discussion follows up on the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review which has some controversial assumptions about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and on Putin’s announcement of a new suite of nuclear weapons.

If the nuclear discussion interests you at all (and it should), this is a must-hear.

Russia’s new nuclear weapons are about missile defense

By Leave a Comment

Vladimir Putin spent a surprising amount of time in his March 1st speech talking about nuclear weapons. Pavel K. Baev has some interesting considerations in Brookings about the possible motivations for this:

Russia’s economic weakness is so profound that Russia cannot possibly engage in anything resembling a real arms race with the United States and NATO. Putin’s enthusiastic rollout of Russia’s missile program scored many good points domestically but produced a mixed impression among his key international audiences. It doesn’t take a shrewd strategic mind to conclude that Russia can only proceed with these entirely unnecessary weapon programs at the expense of addressing its more pressing economic needs and acute security challenges, including Syria. Putin’s posturing cannot meet many strict reality checks, but it is nevertheless, dangerous because it damages the norm of owning nuclear weapons responsibly.

In essence, Baev focuses on Putin’s need to legitimize the new 2027 state armament program, a desire to divert attention from recent poor performance in Syria, and a general inclination to ‘restoring greatness’.

I will add that Russia is truly concerned about the development of a ballistic missile defense in the West. It is debatable whether this concern is rational, but that has little to do with the affective reactions to it in Russia. The weapons that Putin announced are mostly intended to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent in an age of missile defense: A missile with unlimited range to circumvent missile defense stations, supersonic missiles that are impossible to intercept, and a nuclear bomb installed in a torpedo.

So even though Putin talked a lot about nuclear weapons in his speech, there is nothing new when it comes to the Russian doctrine for actually using nuclear weapons. The idea from the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that Russia develops non-strategic nuclear weapons for an escalate-to-deescalate strategy is still a fantasy. Russia’s nuclear development program is focused on strategic missiles, and in the non-strategic realm the goal is to develop more powerful conventional alternatives so they don’t have to use nuclear weapons.

Kofman’s look at Putin’s new weapon announcements (updated)

By Leave a Comment

Last week, Vladimir Putin held a speech in which he announced some spectacular new weapons including supersonic missiles and an intercontinental ballistic missile with nuclear propulsion to give it unlimited range.

Few people are as qualified to comment on the weapon announcements as Michael Kofman. He has just released part 1 in a two-part series about his reflections.

Overall, Kofman’s attitude is that Russia has the capability to develop these weapons, so Putin’s words should be taken seriously:

Mainstream media coverage, and expert opinions have been rather dismissive, and should be taken as cold comfort. Observers are right to say that these technologies will take considerable time to test and deploy, but what many don’t know, because investment in Russian military analysis took a vacation 1992-2014, is actually when testing and development for these weapons began. Since the narrative of a sanctioned, economically weak and decaying Russia tends to prevail, it creates blinders on the issue of military technology. Yes, they can do this, and much of this may become reality in the 2020s. Recall awhile ago when Russian MoD leaked a slide on Status-6 many thought it was a PR stunt, and some kind of joke, until it showed up in the NPR as something less than funny.

In part 1 Kofman looks at:

Kinzhal: An aeroballistic version of the Iskander missile launched from the MiG-31 airplane. It has some remarkable specs. A range of up to 2000 kilometers, a speed of up to mach 10, capable of high-G maneuvers in the terminal phase, and with the option of both conventional and nuclear warheads.

R-28 Sarmat: A liquid fueled heavy intercontinental ballistic missile capable of deploying multiple warheads and penetration aids. It will replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18).

Avangard and/or 4202 hypersonic boost glide weapon: A concept involving an ICBM to boost a weapon to a very high altitude from where it glides toward its target and reaches amazing speed (like mach 20).

Kofman has saved the most spectacular of Putin’s announcements to part 2 in his series.

Update on 2018-03-08:
Part two of Kofman’s series is out. In this he looks at:

9M730: An intercontinental ballistic missile with nuclear propulsion. This gives the missile practically unlimited range, but it is also an inherently dirty design which spreads radiation during flight. Russia has launched an online contest to come up with a good name for the missile.

Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System: A nuclear powered torpedo with a nuclear warhead. This is intended as a threat toward coastal cities in the United States. It will be difficult to build countermeasures against this weapon which for obvious reasons is immune to a missile defense system. It is not a very practical weapon, however, because it will take days to reach its destination. This makes it impossible to control escalation once the weapon is launched. The weapon must be characterized as a revenge weapon which can be used when the war in general is already lost.

Klavesin-2R-PM Unmanned Undersea Vehicle: An underwater drone system which is an evolution of the 1R variant.

Some laser weapon: A rather mysterious laser cannon thing with an unclear purpose.

U.S. Nuclear Posture Review misses the point on Russia

By Leave a Comment

Nuclear Posture Review cover pageThe Pentagon published its Nuclear Posture Review for 2018 (NPR) earlier in February. It dramatically changes some assumptions about nuclear weapons that were laid out in the previous NPR from 2010.

The new NPR concludes that there has been a deterioration in international relations with a return to great power competition and a more complex threat environment. This causes the Pentagon to advise an ambitious plan to enhance the nuclear capabilities of the United States.

Of special interest is the American focus on Russia’s so-called escalate-to-deescalate strategy. The idea is that Russia would escalate a conflict to intimidate the West into accepting peace on Russia’s terms. According to the NPR this has lowered the nuclear threshold because Russia will use non-strategic nuclear weapons to achieve this goal. The West does not have the same arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons as Russia, and according to the NPR this may lead Russia to believe that they could get away with a small scale nuclear attack. Therefore the NPR suggests an increased focus on establishing an American arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

…Continue reading

Nuclear weapons aren’t actually a deterrent on their own

By Leave a Comment

Mark Galeotti makes an interesting point in this post on War on the Rocks titled Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent Isn’t a Military Asset, and Shouldn’t Be Funded as One.

The financial aspect of the argument is less interesting than the military point. Galeotti argues that two expensive projects, namely the two new aircraft carriers with accompanying F-35s and the nuclear deterrent, tie up so much of the defense budget that it causes disproportionate harm to other capabilities. If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the defense budget to some other post in the national budget, there would be more money left for other military projects. I lack the insight to see how this would be different from just increasing the defense budget, if the problem is that the national economy is sluggish.

But the military point is really good: Credible deterrence requires available assets that are relevant for the possible conflict scenarios. Nobody can imagine that the United Kingdom would use the Trident missiles in response to a limited military confrontation, so it is not a useful deterrent.

The British nuclear missiles are based on submarines, and the new Dreadnought-class, the replacement of the Vanguard-class, will be extremely expensive to build and maintain. They will be a valuable political instrument for the United Kingdom, but they will not be a replacement for other military assets.

So it comes down to the point that if the United Kingdom wants expensive military equipment to serve a specific political goal, they should acknowledge that there is a cost involved. Cutting the parts of the military that actually create deterrence is a really dumb strategy.

Russia’s new strategic bombers will fly soon

By Leave a Comment

Dave Majumdar for The National Interest:

Early next year in February, the first of Russia’s new production Tupolev Tu-160M2 Blackjack supersonic strategic bombers will take to the air.

The new bomber is essentially a prototype of a next generation variant of the venerable Blackjack, the first generation of which was built during the 1980s in the last days of the Soviet Union. Russia operates 16 of the surviving aircraft as long-range cruise missile carriers as a key part of its strategic bomber force. The aircraft have performed well during Russia’s Syria campaign acting as launch platforms for the stealthy MKB Raduga H-101 cruise missile, which is thought to have a range between 4,500MKm and 5,500Km.

[…]

The Russians plan to buy about fifty of the new Tu-160 variant. It is also likely that the 16 original model Tu-160 airframes will be upgraded to the new standard. Moscow can make do with the upgraded Tu-160M2 for its strategic bomber force because unlike the United States Air Force, the Russian Air Force does not expect the massive aircraft to penetrate into enemy airspace to deliver its payload. Instead, the Tu-160—which is capable of speeds of over Mach 2.0—would dash into position to launch long-range standoff cruise missiles. As such, stealth is not considered to be particularly important. Indeed, one of the advantages of a highly visible strategic bomber is that it enables nuclear signaling.

Interesting point that if the missiles have a range of over 4000 kilometers, the aircraft doesn’t need to be stealth.

Missile defense is not as effective as Donald Trump believes

By Leave a Comment

Figuring out the effectiveness of a missile defense system is complicated business, and often the matter is oversimplified in order to make it understandable.

It is for example easy to confuse the maximum range of a missile with the size of an area that the missile could potentially protect. For a variety of reasons that is not the case because the effective range of an air defense missile is much smaller and depends on the relative movements between the incoming missile and the air defense missile. This misunderstanding of the effective coverage area can for example be found in the Danish debate about the need for SM2 missiles on the frigates of the Iver Huitfeldt class, where it has been widely claimed that a single frigate with these missiles would be able to protect most of the country. While a circle around the center of Denmark with the radius of the maximum range of an SM2 missile does cover most of the country on the map, that is unfortunately not even close to the actual effective protection that such a frigate would provide.

But even more importantly, the success of the missile defense system depends on probability calculations that are somewhat counterintuitive for most people. It is not just a simple matter of missiles one-on-one, but a question of figuring out an overall probability of success in a scenario with X number of incoming missiles against Y number of defensive missiles. And the uncomfortable truth is that it usually doesn’t take very many incoming missiles to saturate your defensive system.

A basic understanding of the mathematics of probability is therefore important when trying to determine the effectiveness of your missile defense system and the level of trust you can put on that system. If decision makers don’t understand the concept of probability, they may get overconfident about their defensive systems.

A few weeks ago, Donald Trump talked to Fox News about North Korea:

“We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time, and if you send two of them it’s gonna get knocked out.”

So president Trump seems confident in his defense system against ballistic missiles from North Korea, and that may lead him to believe that a preemptive first strike could be a good idea. But as Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang show in War On The Rocks, the president is wrong:

Trump’s remarks, however, make it clear that he believes each interceptor has [a single-shot probability of kill] of 97 percent (rather than 57 percent). Hence “if you send two of them it’s gonna get knocked out.” This is a wildly inflated — almost delusional — sense of how accurate the system is, and how many North Korean ICBMs it could potentially successfully intercept. Trump’s claim is …Continue reading

Russia’s ship with ballistic missile radar could literally save the world

By Leave a Comment

The Russian ship Marshal Krylov has been updated to make it possible to track ballistic missiles. The story in Izvestia caught my attention because of a rather bold statement that the ship is now able to detect launched missiles anywhere in the world, which seems like a marvelous technical breakthrough given that the earth is round. Have Russian scientists figured out a way to measure athmospheric incidents on the other side of the planet, and if so, why have they intalled it on a ship instead of placing it on land which seems more convenient? Turns out the ship cannot see around corners, and the trick to seeing what’s happening on the other side of the planet is to move the ship. Oh, well.

It is still interesting that Russia now has this maritime capability, though. The ship was originally built to support the Russian space program but has been updated to give it a military purpose as well. It has been assigned to the Russian Pacific Fleet, which makes a lot of sense because this seems like the hot spot for ballistic missiles.

It is comforting to know that Russia prioritizes this matter. Literally speaking, the safety of the world could depend on Russia’s ability to monitor missile launches from North Korea and possible American countermeasures. There are some really scary perspectives in the possibility that Russia could misunderstand the launch of American ballistic countermeasures as a massive nuclear strike, and a better Russian situational picture is really good news.

Russia destroys its last chemical weapons

By Leave a Comment

Russia has destroyed the last chemical weapons from its arsenal. The occasion was announced by Putin personally, and the president was not slow to point out that Russia beat USA in reaching the milestone. That reports postimees.ee (in Estonian).

In fact both Russia and USA have failed to meet the 2012 deadline for the destruction its chemical weapons. The fact that Russia came first really must be understood in the sense that they were first among those who came too late. That didn’t stop Putin from jabbing out against the Americans in his statement that painted the occasion as an example that Russia is taking the lead in building a safer world.

The fact that Russia no longer has chemical weapons really is noticeable in a historical perspective. It is good to know that a war in Europe will not be fought with chemical weapons. Of course one must also acknowledge that the reason the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) from 1997 is still being honored by Russia and USA is that chemical weapons don’t fit into current military doctrines of either country. While it’s sort of a free ride to fulfill the CWC from a military perspective, it’s still nice to see that at least some agreements from the era of deescalation stand the test of time.