Germany

From a Baltic Commanders Conference to a maritime component command in 10 years

2021-04-24 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Sebastian Bruns and Julian Pawlak on CIMSEC:

As early as 2015, the Baltic Commanders Conference (BCC), a consultation format, was launched in response to altered security policy constellations and was intended to strengthen communication and cooperation between the neighboring navies – including non-Baltic state Norway, but without Russia.
The German Maritime Forces Staff (DEU MARFOR), established in 2019, bundles together the previous smaller task forces in Germany and, with German and international posts, will form the core staff of the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC), which is currently being set up. From 2025 the German Navy intends to develop key maritime skills with the BMCC and seeks to be able to take over the tactical leadership of multinational units in the Baltic, the North Sea, and the North Atlantic. For this purpose, NATO’s unique “Baltic Sea Headquarters” will be offered as a command center for national and allied defense operations on the northern flank.

Remarkable how much can change in one decade.

Russia’s military budget has nothing to do with the GDP of Spain

2018-06-04 By Anders Puck Nielsen 1 Comment

The size and durability of Russia’s defense budget and economy in general is a source of much debate. One particular figure that I often encounter is that Russia has an equivalent GDP to Spain. The meaning apparently is that a country the size of Spain cannot sustain an armed force to compete for world leadership in the long run.

For example, Danish rear admiral Nils Wang uses the Spain trope in this interview to OLFI before his retirement as chief of the Danish Defense Academy. Wang presents the case that the military tensions between NATO and Russia are not comparable to the Cold War because with a GDP the size of Spain’s, Russia will not be able to hold territory in Western Europe after an initial occupation.

There are a few problems with this line of reasoning. First, historically the USSR never had an impressive GDP either. There are many complicating factors when comparing economies of different countries, especially when one of them has a fundamentally different economic system like the communist one. But in general, it seems that in second half of the 20th century, the Soviet Union had a GDP which was smaller than the combined GDP of West Germany and France. The combined GDP of all NATO countries beat the Soviet GDP by many lengths.

Another problem with the Spain comparison is that things don’t cost the same in different countries. In some places you just get more for your money than in others. It is cheaper to have a large army if the wages are low and equipment is inexpensive. To account for that, you need to correct the GDPs for purchasing power parity (PPP) before comparing different countries.

Nominally, the GDPs of Russia and Spain are roughly in the same ballpark. In 2017, Russia was number 12 in the world with a GDP of 1,527,469 million USD, and Spain was number 14 with a GDP of 1,313,951 million USD. So Russia’s GDP was about 14 percent larger than Spain’s in 2017. But if the numbers are corrected for purchasing power parity, Russia is number 6 in the world, just a tiny bit behind Germany and well ahead of both the United Kingdom, France, or Spain. Russia’s GDP (PPP) was 4,007,831 million Int$, and Germany’s was 4,170,790 million Int$. (Source: IMF)

The very similar GDPs (PPP) between Russia and Germany give room for an interesting perspective: Their defense spendings as percent of GDP indicate the same amount of stuff that one could buy for that money.¹

In 2017, Germany spent 44.3 billion USD on defense which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP. Russia spent 66.3 billion USD, which was 4.3 percent of GDP (source: SIPRI). But because their GDPs with corrections for purchasing power parity are the same, Germany would have to increase their defense spending to 4.3 percent of GDP or 158.7 billion USD to afford the same investments as Russia.

Since playing with numbers is so much fun, I decided correct the defense budgets of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom for purchasing power parity and see how that compares to Russia’s military spending. With a GDP (PPP) of 4,007,831 million Int$ and a defense share of GPD of 4.3 percent, Russia’s defense planners had 172,336.7 million Int$ to spend in 2017. The other countries scored as follows:

In other words, corrected for purchasing power, Russia has a larger military budget than Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined. Because graphs are fun too, I also illustrated this point.

Defense spending (PPP) — Corrected for purchasing power, Russia has a larger military budget than Germany, France, and the UK combined.

Recently, there have been reports that Russia’s military budget declined by 20 percent in 2017 compared to 2016. Some have argued that this decline was inevitable given the poor condition of Russia’s economy. But as Michael Kofman has explained, Russia’s military budget is neither declining nor unsustainable. Instead, the apparent decline in defense spending in 2017 is due to technicalities like periodization of expenses in the national budget. Indicators suggest a stable level of defense spending which is sustainable in the long run in terms of manpower, materiel, and money.

So while Russia does have a GDP the size of Spain’s, that doesn’t say much about their military potential. More interestingly, Russia has a defense budget which gives them the same purchasing power as the combined military spending of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. And they can afford to keep it up in the foreseeable future.

As Oliker has pointed out, there are many complicating factors when comparing defense spending across borders. For example, it is different what countries include as defense expenses. If anything, such a consideration would only strengthen the argument in this article. European countries have incentives to make their defense spending appear higher than it really is, whereas Russia has incentives to make it appear lower. ↩

Germany buys six C-130 transport and tanker planes for French-German squadron

2018-05-07 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The U.S. State Department has approved the sale of three C-130J transport aircraft and three KC-130J tanker aircraft to Germany. The expected value of the contract is $1.4 billion.

Germany will use these aircraft in a combined French-German transport squadron based in Évreux, Normandy. The squadron will consist of four French C-130J and the six German aircraft. This gives both countries flexible and reliable transport and in-flight refueling capabilities. In addition to the airplanes, the cooperation also includes shared logistics, infrastructure, maintenance, support, and training.

The first French C-130J arrived in December. The squadron is expected to reach initial operational capability in 2021 and to be fully operational in 2024.

The German and French interest in the C-130 platform caused attention when it was first voiced in 2015. Both countries are heavily invested in the development of the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, and it was unexpected that they would also invest in the smaller American competitor.

However, the A400M is delayed, and the retirement of the countries’ old Transall C-160 transport aircraft is well overdue. Germany is retiring C-160 in 2021, and France does the same in 2023. This could potentially leave a capacity gap as the A400M is not ready to take over all their tasks yet.¹

Germany has so far received 18 of the 53 A400M that the country has ordered, and France has received 14 of its 50 aircraft. This is well behind schedule, and the performance of the aircraft has disappointed. For example it is still not possible to perform in-flight refueling from the A400M, and the plane does not meet the requirements for dropping parachute troops. So the combined French-German fleet of C-130J and KC-130J will fill a gap after the Transall C-160 leaves service.

It is worth noticing that the American C-130J and the Airbus A400M are two very different types of aircraft with partially complementary strengths. The C-130J is much smaller and capable of using a stretch of dirt road as a runway. So the C-130J will also be useful alongside the A400M for missions that the larger aircraft cannot solve.

The story is similar to Sweden’s purchase of Blackhawk helicopters. The NH90 got so delayed that it wasn’t operational in time for the Super Puma’s retirement, so Sweden had to buy extra helicopters from a reliable producer to fill the gap. What is it with European aircraft factories? ↩

Powerful maritime patrol UAVs to Germany

2018-04-10 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The U.S. State Department has approved the sale of MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance drones to Germany.

Triton is a maritime development of the Global Hawk. It is expected to become operational in the U.S. Navy in 2019, but it will be another few years before it reaches full operational capability. The first German Tritons are not expected to be delivered before 2025.

Germany has expressed interest in buying four Tritons, and the State Department estimates a price of up to $2.5 billion including support equipment and a Mission Control Station. The actual price will depend on the negotiations between Germany and Northrop Grumman who produces the UAV, and it will probably be lower than the State Department’s estimate.

The Triton UAV is one leg in the new American concept for Maritime Patrol Aircraft. The other is the P-8 Poseidon jet which is built on a modified Boeing 737 platform. In rough terms the drone will be used for surveillance of the sea surface, while the P-8 Poseidon will focus on anti-submarine warfare.

MQ-4C Triton has an endurance of more than 24 hours at 55.000 ft (17.000m) with speeds up to 330 knots (611 km/h). It has a wingspan of almost 40 meters which is more than a Boeing 737 jet. The total weight is over 14 tons.

It has a powerful sensor package including surface radar, AIS, real-time video transmission, and electronic support measures (ESM). It can also be integrated into military link networks to provide an alternative to satellite based solutions. In the case of the German version, there will be some modifications to the sensor package with a signals intelligence system from Airbus.

Compared to the Global Hawk, Triton has been optimized for maritime tasks. It has a more robust construction which makes it possible to descend quickly for closer investigation of targets. It is also equipped to withstand the sometimes rough weather conditions over sea, and it has better de-icing, lightning, and bird strike protection.

With the MQ-4C Triton, Germany will get a capable maritime UAV. An important factor for Germany in choosing exactly this UAV has probably been its traffic alert and collision avoidance system. Triton has the safety measures required for operating inside European airspace.

In 2013 Germany had to cancel its previous EuroHawk drone project because it would be terribly expensive to modify the drone to meet European safety regulations. By choosing Triton, Germany will get a UAV which is cleared to fly inside national airspace of NATO members.

New report on Germany’s troubled equipment status

2018-02-27 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Deutsche Welle:

Many primary weapons systems in the Bundeswehr are not available for training exercises or deployment, according to a new Defense Ministry study.

The “Report on the Operational Readiness of the Bundeswehr’s Primary Weapons Systems 2017,” which has been seen by the Reuters news agency and the RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland media group, is set to be presented to Germany’s lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, on Wednesday.

Number of weapon systems ready for action:
– Eurofighter jet airplanes: 39 of 128
– Tornado jet airplanes: 26 of 93
– CH-53 transport helicopters: 16 of 72
– NH-90 transport helicopters: 13 of 58
– Tiger helicopters: 12 of 62
– A400M transport planes: 3 of 15
– Leopard 2 tanks: 105 of 224
– Navy frigates: 5 of 13

So Germany cannot get their NH90 working either.

Russian sea denial in the Baltic Sea

2018-01-23 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Tobias Oder has this interesting analysis of Russia’s sea denial capabilities in the Baltic Sea on cimsec.org. Essentially, the point is that they can close the Eastern part of the Baltic Sea quite effectively, should they want to.

Oder’s analysis is written from a German perspective, but I think many of his recommendations could be broadened out to other countries. They include the attainment of a strike missile capability to challenge Russian surveillance and launch stations, more advanced electronic countermeasures, and the application of mine counter measures (MCM). Oder also points out that the German Navy needs to get its act together and get the submarines back to sea.

…Continue reading

More on Germany’s trouble to keep equipment moving

2017-12-23 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Sébastien Roblin for The National Interest in a piece called Germany Does Not Have One Working Submarine:

One unfortunate consequence is that the submarine crews are completely unable to gain badly needed operational experience. Only by mid-2018 will three German submarines be operational, followed by possibly a fourth that November.

But the kicker is that the Deutsche Marine would not be able to deploy its full submarine force even if all six were in operational condition. According to Bartels, there are only three trained crews available to man the six Type 212As.

Indeed, the German military, which transitioned to being a purely volunteer force in 2011, has struggled to fill its ranks […]

Low readiness rates afflict other branches of the Germany military as well. For example, Germany is currently expanding and upgrading its fleet of Leopard 2 tanks. However, according to NTV, out of 244 Leopard 2 tanks already in service, only ninety-six are combat-ready, while eighty-nine are awaiting spare parts, seven are devoted to R&D and fifty-three are under maintenance or receiving upgrades. Of fourteen new A400M transport planes, sometimes none are in operational condition; one broke down in February 2017 while transporting Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen. In 2015, it was revealed that out of ninety-three Tornado strike jets officially in service, only thirty were combat ready.

Meanwhile some are still speculating how Germany could possibly spend 2 percent of GDP on defense.

Less than half of Germany’s tanks are working

2017-12-03 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

German tanks are in a terrible condition, according to Janes:

German media reported on 16 November that only 95 of the 244 Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs) in service with the Bundeswehr are operationally ready. A further 53 vehicles – thought to be Leopard 2A6Ms – are being converted to the new Leopard 2A6M+ standard, and 86 are in a state of disrepair without any spare parts. The German report states that “the unavailability of the required replacement parts would be detrimental”.

Apparently the German system cannot handle the increased exercise intensity that has developed over the last few years. And that has led to concerns as to how long the German logistics system could function in case of a real conflict.

Janes mentions that there was a similar predicament in August when German forces in Mali suffered from a lack of spare parts. I might add the ridiculous lack of spare parts that left all of Germany’s submarines inoperative. Germany needs to fix this quickly.

Former NATO chief Rasmussen calls Nord Stream 2 a trap for Germany

2017-12-02 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to Bild:

“Of course, everyone knows the direct link between Mr Schröder and Gazprom but I think the SPD’s view on Nord Stream goes back to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and a view that cross-border commerce can help to build a rapprochement between estranged states. This is a noble position to hold, but in my many dealings with Vladimir Putin over the years, I’m afraid it is a little naive. President Putin wants to restore Russian greatness, and that means keeping his sphere of influence in central and eastern Europe. The tool he has to leverage his position is Russian energy. I also doubt whether SPD support for Nord Stream 2 accurately translates Brandt’s approach into the 21st century. If you want to bring about change through trade today, it is surely accomplished by increasing commerce between small and medium-sized businesses, not by buying a highly valuable energy source from Russia’s state-run monopoly.”

Germany will probably replace Tornado with F-35

2017-11-16 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

It looks like Germany might join the F-35 family around 2025. According to Janes the Joint Strike Fighter is the preferred choice as a replacement for the Tornado.

The Tornado will retire around 2030, and the transition to its successor will take about five years. It makes a lot of sense to replace the Tornado with a fifth generation fighter, and the F-35 is the only one available at this time schedule.

Earlier Germany had set its hopes on Airbus to be ready with its New Fighter. However, now it seems that this aircraft will not be ready before the 2040-timeframe. It is therefore much more likely as a replacement for Germany’s Eurofighter Typhoons and the French Dassault Rafale.

The New Fighter is the manned fighter jet in a concept that Airbus calls Future Combat Air System (FCAS). In addition to the New Fighter, Airbus envisions a future where different kinds of manned aircraft and UAV’s operate interconnectedly as a family in the FCAS. One must hope that Airbus makes it easy to integrate products from other manufacturers into FCAS, because otherwise Germany might find itself in a complicated mixed family situation. Connectivity is vital for future air operations, and if Germany’s 85 Tornados and 125 Eurofighters are replaced by the same numbers of F-35s and New Fighters respectively they have to be able to exchange data smoothly.