Russia

Nuclear Notebook publishes status on Russian nuclear forces, 2018

2018-05-03 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris have published an examination of Russia’s nuclear forces in their Nuclear Notebook column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

This is a very comprehensive overview of Russia’s nuclear weapons. It includes informed estimates of the numbers of both launchers and warheads, and there are nice status updates on Russia’s different nuclear capable platforms. For example one can learn that Russia has a total of 4,350 nuclear warheads, of which 1,600 are deployed and ready for use, and 2,750 are in reserve. To this comes 2,500 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.

Russia is in the midst of a modernization program of its nuclear forces. This was well overdue, as many of their nuclear weapons were getting old and needed replacement. I think some Western observers exaggerate the significance of the modernization program. For some this has led to almost hysterical interpretations of Russia’s intentions. I think that the right way to understand Russia’s nuclear weapons program is that they want to maintain the capabilities that they already have.

Dnepr Launch vehicle — Drepr launch vehicle which carries the SS-18 *Satan* ICBM. According to Kristensen and Norris, Russia has 46 of these missiles with up to 460 warheads. Photo: ISC Kosmotras.

Russia is a nuclear great power and intends to remain as such. A conflict between nuclear powers like the United States and Russia will be fought with nuclear weapons. Assuming that a confrontation could be held at the non-nuclear level is naive.

So where some analysts interpret Russia’s nuclear posture as increasingly aggressive, I will point to two other movements that I find more accurate:

Russia invests in the development of nuclear weapons that can defeat a Western missile defense. The goal is to maintain a second strike capability that Russia has had for many years, but which they fear they can lose if the missile defense technology gets good enough.
Fundamentally the new technology for Russia is in the non-nuclear field. Long-range high-precision missiles give Russia more options than nuclear escalation. At the same time this raises the nuclear threshold and makes armed confrontation more likely because the (illusion of) surgically accurate control of destruction makes it easy for politicians to resort to using such weapons.

The Russian nuclear forces, 2018 review includes a summary of the different positions in the debate about Russia’s nuclear strategy. Unfortunately there is an inclination to the views in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which I think gets many things wrong about Russia. But with the two points above in mind, I think that Kristensen and Norris’ column is an outstanding reference about the state of Russia’s nuclear weapons.

What to expect for naval parade in Saint Petersburg on 29 July 2018

2018-04-30 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Russia celebrates Navy Day on the last Sunday of July, and last year a new tradition was established with a grand naval parade in Saint Petersburg. Ships from the Baltic, Northern, Mediterranean, and the Pacific fleets and from the Caspian Flotilla take part in the Grand Naval Parade.

In 2017 the parade got a lot of attention, and Vladimir Putin personally took part in the celebrations. Of particular interest was the participation of the Akula-class (Typhoon) submarine Dmitry Donskoy and the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy. China also sent a few ships for the parade and a subsequent naval exercise in the Baltic.

Putin on Naval Day 2017 — Grand Naval Parade in Saint Petersburg 2017. Photo: Kremlin.ru.

Now details are starting to emerge about the program for the 2018 show. The parade will include 41 ships, 25 aircraft, and more than 4,000 troops. Among the more notable participants are an Antey-class submarine (Oscar II class) and the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov. There will also be a display of the newly commissioned missile corvette Uragan (Karakurt-class) and the frigate Admiral Makarov.

So although we will not see the world’s biggest submarine or battlecruiser this year, there should be plenty of other things to look at when the grand naval parade takes place on 29 July 2018.

Delivery of Russia’s first Borei-A class submarine postponed to 2019

2018-04-26 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The delivery of Russia’s first Borei-A class nuclear submarine Knyaz Vladimir has been postponed to 2019. The construction of the submarine began in 2012, and at first it was expected to enter service in 2017. Then it was postponed to 2018, but now it is clear that it will take even more time before the submarine is ready. That reports FlotProm.

Borei-A is an improved development of the Borei-class. The first Borei-class submarine, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, entered service in 2013, but the construction started already in 1996. There are now three operational Borei-class submarines in the Russian navy, and five Borei-A class ships are under construction.

The Borei class is a nuclear powered submarine which carries 16 Bulava intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. They are the cornerstone in Russia’s future submarine based nuclear deterrent, replacing the Kalmar-class, Delfin-class, and Akula-class submarines (NATO-names Delta-III, Delta IV, and Typhoon).

Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov has earlier announced that Russia is also working on a Borei-B class, but that is still in early development.

Delays are a common phenomenon in Russian warship construction. Current examples include the landing ship Ivan Gren and the frigate Admiral Gorshkov. Ivan Gren will be commissioned on 9 May 2018 after being under construction since 2004. Admiral Gorshkov has been under construction since 2006. It was originally expected to enter service in 2011, but the frigate is still not ready for duty. The latest prognosis is that the navy can take over Admiral Gorshkov in August.

Who cheated whom in Russian-British submarine duel?

2018-04-24 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

After the missile attack in Syria on 13 April, The Times reported that Russian naval forces successfully managed to suppress a British nuclear submarine which prevented it from launching its Tomahawk missiles. Supposedly, one or two Kilo-class submarines, two frigates, and an anti-submarine aircraft made it too difficult and dangerous for the British Astute-class nuclear submarine to move within firing distance from its targets in Syria. Allegedly the British submarine got support from American P-8 Orion maritime patrol aircraft which were tasked to track Russian surface and subsurface naval units.

Unsurprisingly, Russian media picked up the story. However, they cited the British story and did not provide more details from Russian sources.

Astute submarine — Astute class submarine. Photo: Royal Navy.

The whole story is a bit strange, and Michael Peck asked the apt question in The National Interest, Did Russia’s Diesel Submarines Really Hunt Down a British Nuclear Sub? Peck’s analysis focuses mostly on the technical feasibility of such an endeavor. Traditional military calculation would argue that the nuclear submarine has the best odds in a duel, even though the Kilo-class is a worthy competitor. Peck concludes that we just don’t know whether the Russian ships actually tracked down the British submarine, and that we also don’t know whether this prevented the British submarine from launching its weapons.

My take on this is that I don’t think the point of the submarine was to fire any missiles in the first place. Often a submarine is deployed not to deliver weapons but to keep the adversary busy. The mere knowledge that there is a submarine in the area forces the opponent to commit resources to finding it.

I guess that the United Kingdom sent the Astute submarine to keep track of the Russian ships in the area. A well placed news leak made sure that everyone knew about the presence of the submarine. Russian threats to shoot down both missiles and launch sites in case of an attack on Syria didn’t matter much because the submarine wouldn’t be a launch site.

That would have made it the job of the submarine commander to draw as many resources as possible from the Russian pursuers. In other words to be challenging yet achievable.

I don’t know whether this is what happened. But it does seem more plausible than the notion that the Royal Navy hit a streak of bad luck and had their mission blown by an unfortunate news leak and a masterfully executed Russian ASW-operation.

Ships from Russian Baltic Fleet rotate on deployment

2018-04-20 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

The Russian Baltic Fleet rotates some ships on deployment to the Mediterranean.

The frigate Yaroslav Mudry and the tanker Lena have left the Baltic and will join the Russian maritime forces in the Mediterranean. Yaroslav Mudry is a Neustrashimyy-class frigate, which has been in service since 2009. The last long deployment of Yaroslav Mudry was in 2016.

At the same time, the landing ship Minsk is returning from deployment. Minsk is a Ropucha-class ship from 1984, and it left Kaliningrad on 4 October 2017. During its deployment the ship has participated in the unofficially termed operation “Syrian Express” which brings logistical supplies to the Russian forces on the Khmeimim Air Base and to the Syrian government forces.

Minsk conducted a port stay in Lisbon in Portugal before setting course for home on Wednesday 18 April.

Helicopter crashes on Russian problem ship Ivan Gren

2018-04-13 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

A Russian Ka-29 helicopter has crashed in the Baltic Sea on Thursday 12 April. The incident occurred while practicing deck landings at night on the Navy’s new landing ship Ivan Gren. That reports flot.com. Both pilots died in the crash.

Ivan Gren is still undergoing sea trials. Official commissioning by the navy is planned for next month, and the Yantar shipyard does not expect the accident to delay the process. The ship did not receive damages from the crash.

It would be fair to call Ivan Gren a troubled project. Works on the ship started in 2004, and delivery has been delayed many times. The ship was launched in 2012, and sea trials began in 2016.

A problem with the ship’s astern propulsion has proven particularly difficult to remedy. Apparently it is challenging to control the ship’s movements while going astern. On the next ship in the series, Petr Morgunov, the shipyard will change the direction of rotation on the propellers to see if that helps. If the reversed rotation gives better manageability, it will be changed on Ivan Gren as well.

The Russian Navy has decided not to order more ships of the Ivan Gren class than the two already under construction.

American journal calls Kuznetsov a bad aircraft carrier, Russian media has a fit

2018-04-07 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

A somewhat entertaining dispute has erupted between the American website The National Interest and the Russian press corps.

The National Interest has made a list of the 5 Worst Aircraft Carriers Ever Put to Sea, and the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov is on that list. That does not go over well in Russia.

For example Lenta.ru has collected statements from a range of Russian military experts who disregard the American website as a propaganda tool in an anti-Russian campaign.

The Russian experts also complain that the American journal includes Admiral Kuznetsov in a list of “aircraft carriers” because actually it is an “aircraft-carrying missile cruiser”. Those things are apparently not comparable at all.

One of the Russian experts explains that Admiral Kuznetsov held up very well during the operations in Syria (despite losing two aircraft), and another claims that the Russian ship brings more strategic weight to the battlefield than a modern American carrier which is little more than a floating airport.

Ah, well…

The other four ships on the list are the British HMS Eagle from 1924, the French Bearn from 1927, the Japanese HIJMS Kaga from 1928, and the American USS Ranger from 1934.

The Russian media seems convinced that the list is prioritized so Admiral Kuznetsov is named the worst aircraft carrier ever. As far as I can tell, it is just in chronological order.

Fear of missile defense traces back to World War II for Russia

2018-04-06 By Anders Puck Nielsen 1 Comment

Austin Long has a thorough account of the Soviet and Russian fear of Western missile defense capabilities in War on the Rocks under the title “Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons”.

He explains Putin’s revelation of new nuclear weapons in his March 1st speech as grounded in an old Russian concern with Western missile defense technology. The experience of being unable to respond to the German air campaign during World War II caused Stalin to focus intensely on the ability to retaliate in case of a nuclear attack. Already at that time there was talk about the dangers of an American missile defense which would leave Russia vulnerable to a first strike.

So when the Russian leadership is determined not to let an American missile defense threaten the retaliatory power of Russia, it is in line with a long history of military thinking.

So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition.

Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position.

Gerasimov on the characteristics of modern warfare

2018-04-03 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov held a speech at the Military Academy in Moscow during a March 22-23 conference. Here he reflected on the trends of modern warfare and the general geopolitical situation that faces Russia.¹

I thought it would be interesting to look at his messages, especially in the light of Putin’s March 1st speech to the Federal Assembly where he showcased a range of new strategic nuclear weapons.

A complete transcript of Gerasimov’s speech has not been published. However, Krasnaya Zvezda has a fairly comprehensive account of the speech with many direct quotes. It seems good enough to get the idea.²

I often find Gerasimov’s statements informative when trying to understand how the Russian military establishment sees itself and the world. Putin and defense minister Shoigu have a different agenda in their public appearances where the intended audience is either the Russian public or foreign states. Gerasimov, however, addresses the military personnel, so his goal is more to make sense and direction than to impress or instill fear.

Let’s not question the future of Königsberg

2018-03-31 By Anders Puck Nielsen Leave a Comment

Next time you think the Russians are paranoid for believing that NATO might attack them, keep this in mind:

Jüri Saar has an article titled “The Future of Königsberg” in Diplomaatia, which is an Estonian think tank publication. In this he argues that the 1975 Helsinki Accords are no longer valid, and that Kaliningrad is essentially an illegally occupied territory which the West should demand to get back.

“The issue of the territorial ownership of the Kaliningrad Oblast after the Russians leave is considered a problem. The area could become a new bone of contention between Germany, Poland and Lithuania. For this reason, it must not be merged with the territory of any existing country. The solution, however, is also as plain as day. Königsberg must become the first region solely under the jurisdiction of the European Union, similar to the capital of the US, which forms a separate administrative unit, the District of Columbia.”

This is probably the worst idea I’ve seen all month. In fact it’s so bad I had to read the article twice to look for signs that it is meant as a joke.

Saar more or less proposes that the West should seek regime change in Kaliningrad through a series of hybrid warfare operations. This is exactly what the Russians believe to be the Western doctrine, and what chief the the general staff Valery Gerasimov has pointed out that Russia needs to prepare for. If I were a Russian military strategist, I’d be pretty happy about those Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad now.

What we need is to create certainty about the existing borders. Both sides must believe that the opponent accepts the borders as they are. It may require some fortification before we get to that point, but it also requires cogency.

Silly suggestions like this one which question the border drawing in the Baltic region are flat out dangerous.